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Abstract 
This thesis aims to investigate which factors are the major determinants of capital structure 
decisions for globally listed shipbuilding companies, and how quickly they adjust their capital 
structures when deviating from their target leverage ratios. Earlier academic articles have 
highlighted a number of firm specific factors that determine capital structures in other 
industries. This thesis gives special attention to the similarities between the merchant shipping 
industry researched by Drobetz et al. (2013) and the shipbuilding industry. We will use and 
apply determinants tested on the shipping industry to our sample of shipbuilders, but also add a 
set of new industry specific variables. To a large extent, unobserved company specific effects 
drive shipbuilders’ capital structure decisions. Using a range of multiple regression models we 
find size, asset risk, and the market to book ratio to be the most influential observable 
determinants of capital structure. Our results imply that shipbuilding companies do not follow 
one explicit capital structure theory, but a combination of the trade-off theory and the pecking 
order theory. The former theory dominates the firm level determinants, whereas the latter 
dominates with regards to the influence from the macroeconomic environment. Shipbuilders 
can be said to have relatively lower adjustment than deviation costs compared to other 
industries, as shipbuilders tend to adjust their capital structures significantly faster. The rate of 
adjustment is heavily dependent on macroeconomic cycles because the shipbuilders actively 
change their leverage ratios much slower in times of recession. This indicates that the 
adjustment costs increase during worsened economic conditions.   
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1. Introduction  
In this section we provide a brief introduction to the shipbuilding market and its financing. We 
elaborate some aspects that make the capital structure decisions of shipbuilders interesting. 
Finally, we present how this thesis contributes compared to previous studies.  
The shipbuilding market facilitates world trade by providing its most essential tool – ships. The 
industry builds, maintains, repairs and converts complex ships and marine hardware for various 
seaborne commercial activities. Dry bulk carriers, cargo vessels, tankers, multipurpose vessels, 
and container ships are examples of the most common ship types in production (Stopford, 
2009). In terms of geography, shipyards1 have a range of international owners, but are located 
within regional clusters. Illustratively, most shipbuilding activity is set in China, South Korea 
and Japan (BRS, 2014).   
  
                                                 
1 Throughout this thesis, shipbuilder and shipyard are used interchangeably, but they always refer to a company involved in 
shipbuilding activities.  
Figure 1-2: Illustration of world shipbuilding hubs (Clarksons, 2014a) 
Figure 1-1: Shipping industry value chain (ECORYS, 2012, p. 25) 
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1.1 Shipyard Financing 
According to the European Commission (2003), the average shipyard is primarily financed by 
equity. Thus, debt constitutes a smaller share of the total financing. Based on thoughts from the 
European Commission (2001) a shipyard’s liabilities seem to consist of two main components; 
stationary debt financing related to the physical shipyard and mortgages connected to the 
individual shipbuilding project’s construction financing.  
In general shipbuilding requires high upfront capital costs and long tenors (European 
Commission, 2013), which can be assumed to create challenges for obtaining financing. 
However, to our knowledge little academic attention has been directed towards investigating 
how shipbuilders choose their leverage ratios. In the following we highlight some aspects that 
make shipyards’ capital structure decisions interesting to research. We assess payment risks and 
security requirements, governmental interference, price dynamics, and shipyard heterogeneity, 
but acknowledge that these do not exhaustively represent all factors that influence shipyard 
financing.  
1.1.1 Payment Risks and Security Requirements 
The first aspects influencing shipyard financing are rooted in payment schedules and security 
requirements. New vessels are funded through project financing, which can be divided into a 
pre- and post-delivery phase (Stopford, 2009).  
Shipyards depend on progress payments to fulfil the cash flow requirements associated with 
vessel construction (Fisher, 2008). Shipowners try to ensure that progress payments are only 
made for completed work. However, with payments based on physical progress shipbuilders 
have reduced incentives to finish non-direct producing work in a timely manner. Consequently, 
it is usual for the shipyards to receive payments based on a wide set of milestones (Fisher, 2008). 
The payments represent a risk transfer from the shipyard to the shipowner, as the shipyard’s risk 
decreases when receiving the remuneration. Payments can be front-ended, evenly distributed or 
back-ended (European Commission, 2001). Prior to 2009, the convention was five even 
payments of 20% each, whereas some yards accepted payments as low as 1%-10% (Credit 
Suisse, 2013). The financing method itself is a competitive factor for the shipyards (European 
Commission, 2003) and it is fair to assume that back-ended payment schedules occur more 
frequently during depressions. Clarksons (2014a) reports that in early 2014 ABG Shipyard 
accepted 100% back-ended payments to attract new business following their financial problems 
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Back Ended Payment 
Schedule
Front-Ended Payment 
Schedule
Even Payment Schedule
Figure 1-3: Illustration of payment schedules based on (European Commission, 2001) 
and debt restructurings. Risks should be higher for the shipbuilders with back- than front-ended 
payments, because the uncertainty of receiving the payments is higher. According to the 
European Commission (2001), back-end loading of payments leads to larger interest expenses 
for the shipyard. As risk is of great importance to investment decisions (Berk & DeMarzo, 
2013), the difference in payment schedules complicates shipyard financing.  
According to Alizadeh and Nomikos (2009) a shipyard faces credit risks because it agrees to 
engage in business with an investor who might not intend or be able to fulfil her commitment 
toward the yard. Connected to this shipbuilders face risks like providing credit provisions, 
receiving untimely payments, and the customer’s failure to accept the vessel when finished. 
Additionally, if a buyer perceives that a shipyard experiences financial distress they might stop 
paying instalments. This would increase the probability of default for the shipyard (the 
Economist, 2013).    
Shipyard financing is further complicated by the security requirements from banks and 
shipowners. The European Commission (2003) state that it is common that the value of a 
shipbuilder’s annual production exceeds the value of the company itself. A ship in progress is 
not regarded as a capitalized asset, but rather as work in progress using IAS 112 (European 
Commission, 2009). Consequently, using the complete value of a ship under construction as 
collateral value for a shipyard’s loans is difficult. Simultaneously the shipyard must account for 
the total liabilities of a shipbuilding project. In addition to this, ship investors often demand 
                                                 
2 IAS is an abbreviation for International Accounting Standards, comprising accounting standards prior to 2001. Newer 
standards are published through the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), however, the IAS are still valid unless 
new standards concerning the same subjects are issued (Hamberg, 2012) 
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refund guarantees from the shipyards for their down payments during the vessel construction 
(Fraser, 2009), which increases the needed amount of debt financing for a project.  
1.1.2 Governmental Interference 
A second aspect increasing the complexity of shipyard financing is governmental interference. 
As shipyards generate foreign currency income and employ a significant number of workers, the 
maritime industry is an integral part of economic development. Thus, governments have a 
tendency to assist their shipbuilding industries and thereby distort the free market forces (Glen, 
2006). Strategic investments resulting in excess production capacity can create an imbalance 
between supply and demand in the shipbuilding market (European Commission, 2003). If 
shipyards accept orders despite making losses to utilize production facilities and unsustainable 
capacity is kept in existence by government support, it is fair to assume that the market prices 
will decrease. As prices deteriorate, further losses will be endured requiring new government 
interventions to save shipyards from bankruptcy. Thus, governmental interference can create an 
unstable and risky operating environment that has the potential of distorting corporate financial 
decisions.  
Historically the shipbuilding industry has received many different governmental support 
measures (e.g. debt forgiveness, interest relief by government-controlled banks, loan guarantees) 
(European Commission, 2003). State ownership in shipyards can be said to create a comparative 
financial advantage over privately owned shipbuilders, since governments most often are 
considered both liquid and solvent by the shipping banks (OECD, 2008). Government 
supported credit lines also distorts market dynamics, as shipowners are induced to order new 
ships even though the economic conditions may be depressed (European Commission, 2013).  
1.1.3 Price Dynamics  
Issues related to price dynamics represent a third aspect influencing shipyard financing. 
According to Alizadeh and Nomikos (2009) the shipbuilding market is almost perfectly 
competitive as shipowners gather quotes from multiple shipyards before placing an order and 
there are no barriers restricting them from competing internationally. Newbuild prices are 
settled in an equilibrium process between yard-supply and investor-demand, but also depend on 
general market conditions (e.g. the price of steel, freight rates, the orderbook of the shipyard 
and industry orderbook, the contract terms). There is a substantial lag between ordering and 
delivery lasting everything from a couple of months to multiple years (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 
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Figure 1-5: Clarksons Newbuilding Price Index 
(Clarksons, 2014d) 
Figure 1-4: World orderbook and deliveries 
(Clarksons, 2014c) 
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2009). The developments in the period 1997-2013 offer a tangible example of the delivery lag as 
peak deliveries was reached in 2011 two years after the peak in orderbook. Over the course of 
the delivery lag, the economic viability of a shipbuilding project may change substantially due to 
ship price fluctuations (Alizadeh & Nomikos, 2012). Because of unfavourable market 
conditions, customers may force forward postponements of delivery (Bakkelund, 2013). 
Consequently, these factors will influence the availability and cost of financing for shipyards.   
  
1.1.4 Operational Heterogeneity of Shipbuilders 
A fourth interesting aspect complicating the financing decisions is that shipyards are 
heterogeneous along many different dimensions. Ultimately these differences affect the amount 
of financing available to shipyards through influencing their competitiveness. According to Jiang 
and Pettersen (2012) a shipbuilder’s competitiveness depends on its size (e.g. market share) and 
cost position.  
Labor costs can differ substantially between countries and impact shipyard’s competitiveness. 
For example, the main competitive advantage of Chinese shipbuilders has been low labor costs 
(Jiang & Pettersen, 2012). Another source of competitiveness is quality. According to Hyundai 
Heavy Industries (2014), technological quality is of major strategic importance to shipbuilders. 
Quality can also be associated with reliability and as pointed out by Fearnleys (2014), a timely 
delivery of a vessel from the shipyard is very important to the customer. This is because 
foregone revenue opportunities due to delays are very costly. Overall, low-cost-based shipyards 
tend to win more contracts for constructing larger tankers and bulk carriers, whereas those able 
to deliver superior technological solutions are better positioned with LNGs and SPVs 
(Fearnleys, 2014).  
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Factors connected to size could affect a shipbuilder’s capital structure as larger shipyards can be 
assumed to utilize economies of scale easier and offer a wider product range. Additionally, 
increased size could be associated with a larger number of contracts from multiple customers. 
Combined these factors should contribute to diversify and lower the shipyard’s operational risk. 
Larger shipbuilders can also be more visible than smaller peers to investors. This increased 
recognition effect can be assumed to influence the volume of financing available to the 
individual shipyard. Based on the composition of the shipbuilding market, size evidently 
influences competitiveness. This understanding can be drawn from the fact that the top ten 
shipyards possess a fairly dominant share of the overall world orderbook.  
1.2 Contribution of Our Study  
Our study contributes in three ways compared to previous studies. First, we contribute by 
examining the previously under-researched shipbuilding industry. Despite the four aspects 
making shipyard financing interesting, there is to our knowledge no available research on their 
capital structure decisions. Our second contribution comes from including macroeconomic 
factors in our model. In the study of capital structure decisions, including macroeconomic 
parameters has received scarce academic attention. Compared to previous papers, we have 
included both formerly researched determinants and brand new shipbuilding specific indicators. 
Third, we contribute by examining the dynamics of capital structure decisions by evaluating how 
rapidly shipbuilders adjust toward their target leverage ratios. Although a dynamic evaluation of 
capital structure seems common among academic papers, former master theses published by 
NHH have mostly emphasized capital structure in a static environment.   
Figure 1-6: Global orderbook 
composition by yard (Clarksons, 
2014a) 
Figure 1-7: Cost distribution as of 
2009 for China, South Korea, and 
Japan (Jiang & Pettersen, 2012) 
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Figure 2-1: Examples of capital markets imperfections (Berk & DeMarzo, 2013) 
2. Capital Structure Theory  
Capital structure theory helps us understand which factors affect the relationship between a 
company’s capital structure and its value. This dynamic occurs as the combination of debt and 
equity influences the firms’ value through altering the cost of capital and financial risk (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991). In capital structure optimization the goal is to choose the leverage that maximizes 
company value (Myers, 2001). Alternatively, the decision can be seen as minimizing the 
weighted average cost of capital.  
Modigliani and Miller (M&M) (1958) were among the first contributors to capital structure 
theory. They showed that capital structure is irrelevant in a market of perfect competition. 
However, their initial findings can be characterized as rather unrealistic, as the effects of taxes, 
risk, cost of bankruptcy, agency costs, and asymmetric information are not taken into account. 
By introducing market imperfections to the M&M model the attractiveness of debt and equity 
changes, making the choice of capital structure highly relevant. A comprehensive theory 
explaining all patterns of leverage ratios does not exist (Parsons & Titman, 2009; Graham & 
Leary, 2011). Nevertheless, the trade-off theory, the pecking order theory, and the market 
timing theory emerge as more sophisticated versions of the M&M (1958) model taking into 
account more realistic market assumptions.  
2.1 The Trade-Off Theory 
The trade-off theory states that the capital structure of a company is determined by the trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of using debt financing (Litzenberg & Kraus, 1973). The original 
idea builds on M&M’s (1958) findings by assuming the existence of an optimal leverage ratio, 
but differs in introducing corporate income tax to the irrelevance proposition. The main theory 
dynamic is that the marginal benefit of further increases in debt declines as the level of total 
debt increases. Simultaneously, the marginal cost of the additional debt increases. A company 
looking to optimize its overall value will take on additional debt until the marginal benefit equals 
the marginal costs. The reached equilibrium is known as the optimal leverage ratio.  
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Figure 2-2: Illustration of trade-off theory's implications on firm value (Brealey et al., 2009, p. 453) 
The trade-off theory offers several assessments of the costs and benefits of debt. Today, the 
tax-bankruptcy and the agency perspectives remain the most popular. On the one hand, the tax-
bankruptcy perspective illustrates the tax benefits a firm can obtain from holding debt. These 
benefits must be balanced against the increased financial distress and possible bankruptcy costs 
associated with choosing debt as the source of financing (Litzenberg & Kraus, 1973). On the 
other hand, the agency perspective explains that debt finance is embedded with a manager-
shareholder conflict. Both Stulz (1996) and Jensen (1986) argue that due to the seniority of debt 
claims, increasing debt has a disciplinary effect on management through reducing the agency 
costs associated with the usage of free cash flows. Increasing debt will thereby reduce 
underinvestment and asset substitution issues (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, while 
increasing leverage might reduce the agency costs of equity the company could stand the risk of 
worsening the bondholder-shareholder conflicts (Gossy, 2007).  
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), Fama and French (2002) as well as Welch (2011) have 
questioned the empirical relevance of the trade off theory. Critique has been directed at the fact 
that debt and equity carry very different characteristics, and comparing the trade-off between 
the two is an unrealistic simplification (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Others have argued that tax rates 
are much more complex than assumed by the model (Graham, 2003), or that bankruptcy costs 
are not transferrable in real life and the theory therefore lacks a dynamic treatment of the costs 
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Model Conflict Benefit of Debt Cost of Debt
Jensen & 
Meckling (1976)
Managerial perquisities Increase managerial ownership Asset substitution
Jensen (1986) Overinvestment Reduce free cash Unspecified
Harris & Raviv 
(1990)
Failure to liquidate Allows investors option to liquidate Investigation costs
Stulz (1990) Overinvestment Reduce free cash Underinvestments
The table summarizes different studies on agency models based on shareholder-management conflicts.
Table 2-1: Comparisons of agency models based on shareholder-management conflicts (Harris & 
Raviv, 1991, p. 303) 
(Haugen & Senbet, 1978). Despite criticism, the trade-off theory remains among the dominant 
theories taught in the study of corporate capital structure.  
2.2 The Pecking Order Theory 
The pecking order theory is an application of Akerlofs (1970) “Market for Lemons” and was 
introduced by Myers in 1984 catering to the shortcomings of the trade-off theory. Insiders and 
outsiders of a firm can be assumed to possess asymmetric information, which results in 
problems concerning adverse selection for raising capital (Myers & Majulf, 1984). A fair 
assumption is that managers possess more information than outside investors about their own 
company’s prospects, risks and value creating asymmetric information between demand and 
supply when companies look for funding (Myers, 1984).  
A firm can choose between retained earnings, debt, and equity to finance its operations and 
investments. As outlined by Berk and DeMarzo (2013) the pecking order theory states that 
existing asymmetric information favors the issue of debt over equity. When a company is 
overvalued, the management has incentives to issue equity in order to maintain the interests of 
its current investors. A rational outside investor would factor this in when considering buying 
the newly issued securities, which lowers the market value of the company. Thus, equity offers 
high adverse selection problems and is the least preferred method of financing. Debt has smaller 
adverse selection problems and is the second most efficient financing option. Retained earnings 
are the preferred source of financing, as they reveal the least information. The pecking order 
theory does not assume that a firm has an optimal leverage ratio (Frank & Goyal, 2009), but 
supports the counter-cyclical behavior of leverage ratios (Halling et al., 2012). When the 
macroeconomic environment is depressed, the mechanism suggests that firms tend to issue less 
equity (Choe et al., 1993).  
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Empirical studies have both celebrated and criticized the pecking order theory. Findings from 
Psillaki and Dakalakis (2009) support the existence of a pecking order in corporate capital 
structure. In their study leverage relates positively with the ratio of tangible assets to total assets 
and the company’s size. Simultaneously, leverage is negatively correlated with profitability and 
risk, which corresponds to internal funds being preferred over external funds. Other studies 
imply that a real life pecking order might not be as elegant as the theory initially implies. 
Different external financing opportunities carry heterogeneous characteristics, which demands a 
more complex pecking order to be comparable and work on a universal basis (Chirinko & 
Singha, 2000; Leary & Roberts, 2010). 
2.3 The Market Timing Theory 
When market imperfections occur, the market timing theory assumes that corporations time 
their capital issues to stock market conditions. Managers will choose to issue equity capital only 
in periods where the capital market conditions are favorable to the firm (Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
Capital structure decisions are seen as the company taking advantage of favorable market 
conditions rather than a dynamic optimization strategy. If a firm is in need of financing, 
managers will select their financing based on which market conditions are the most adequate. 
Exceptionally poor conditions may lead the firm to postpone issuance, whereas a particularly 
good market could induce a firm to issue more capital than needed in order to meet future 
requirements. An example of the market timing theory in practice is the issuance of equity after 
a period of stock price run-up (Frank & Goyal, 2009). The importance of debt versus equity is 
thereby diminished and the theory does not support the understanding of a target capital ratio.  
To some extent the theory is supported by empirical findings. According to Baker and Wurgler 
(2002) companies will finance themselves using equity during favorable stock market conditions 
(e.g. in a market with high stock prices compared to book values). Through their work, the 
authors document that the weighted average of a firm’s previous market to book ratios exerts a 
negative effect on leverage.  
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3. Literature Review 
In this section we briefly outline findings from earlier studies done on standard capital structure 
determinants, the impact of macroeconomic factors, and speed of adjustment estimates. 
Combined these studies provide the basis on which our study is built on.  
3.1 Standard Capital Structure Determinants 
Lemmon et al. (2008) investigated nonfinancial firms in the period 1965-2003 and found two 
notable characteristics about their leverage ratios. First, leverage ratios seem to converge over 
time. Highly levered firms tend to become less levered over time, and vice versa. Second, 
although leverage ratios are converging across companies, more indebted firms tend to remain 
relatively indebted over time. As a consequence, leverage ratios can be said to have both a 
transitory and a permanent component. The importance of these components varies across 
model specifications. Their findings indicate that most of the variance in a firm’s leverage is 
explained by time invariant factors. Lemmon et al. (2008) found book leverage to have a 
positive relationship with tangibility and size. Dividend paying status, profitability, and market 
to book ratio were found to negatively relate with book leverage.  
 
Harrison et al. (2011) studied capital structures of real estate investment trusts (REITs) in the 
period 1990-2008 using a standard OLS regression. Their findings indicated a positive 
relationship between leverage and the tangibility as well as the size of a company. Profitability 
and the market to book ratio exerted a negative effect on the book debt ratio. Since REITs are 
known to contain large illiquid assets prone to market cyclicality, the findings of this research 
are highly comparable to our study of shipbuilders. 
 
Drobetz et al. (2013) studied the capital structure decisions of 115 merchant shipping 
companies in the period 1992-2010. They found that tangibility was positively related to book 
leverage, whereas profitability, annual volatility of stock returns, and operating leverage were 
negatively related to book leverage. In line with what is observed in other industries, shipping 
companies’ leverage ratios are to a large extent driven by time-invariant factors.  
Frank and Goyal (2009) studied factors affecting the capital structures of all listed American 
companies in the period from 1950 to 2003. As indicated by their findings, the median industry 
leverage, tangibility, logarithm of assets, and expected inflation all had a positive effect on the 
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Table 3-1: Empirical findings of capital structure determinants 
Lemmon et al. 
(2008)
Frank and Goyal 
(2009)
Gropp & Heider 
(2010)
Harrison et al. 
(2011)
Drobetz et al 
(2013)
Tangibility +*** +*** + +*** +***
Market to book -*** -*** -*** -*** +
Profitability -*** -*** -*** -*** -*
Size +*** +*** +*** + +
Operating Leverage NA NA NA NA -
Dividend Payer -/+ -*** - NA -
Asset Risk NA NA -*** NA -***
Rating Probability NA NA NA NA +
Firm Fixed Effects Yes No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Sample Industry: Non-financial 
firms
Publicly traded 
American firms
Banks REITs Merchant Shipping
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table summarizes empirical findings on standard leverage determinants . "+" indicates a positive relationship 
with  leverage, whereas a "-" indicates a negative relationship. NA means that the study did not include the 
variable in question. Column 1, 4, and 5 have book leverage as their dependent variable, whereas column 2 and 3 
displays results using market leverage.
market leverage. Leverage ratios were affected negatively by profitability and the market to book 
ratio. An identical analysis performed with book values was mostly consistent with the findings 
of market leverage, except that firm size, market-to-book ratio, and inflation were concluded as 
unreliable leverage predictors. They also revealed that lower leverage was more prominent 
amongst firms with stable dividend paying strategies.  
Gropp and Heider (2010) studied the relationship between debt and equity of large European 
and U.S. banks in the period from 1991 to 2004. Market to book, profitability and asset risk 
were shown to relate negatively with market leverage, while size experienced a positive 
relationship. Unobserved time-invariant effects were pointed out as the primary determinant of 
the sample companies’ capital structure decisions. The result indicated similarities between 
banks’ and non-financial firms’ capital structure decisions.  
3.2 Impact of Macroeconomic Factors 
Including macroeconomic factors in the study of capital structure decisions has received 
relatively scarce attention in academic literature (Halling et al., 2012). We will now briefly outline 
the main findings of three studies that have included macroeconomic factors.  
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Korajczyk and Levy (2003) show that unconstrained firms have counter-cyclical movements in 
their book and market leverage. Constrained firms experienced pro-cyclical leverage ratios. In a 
later related study, Halling et al. (2012) found further proof for counter-cyclicality in market 
leverage ratios among non-financial firms. However, pro-cyclicality was observed for book 
leverage. 
In addition to the standard leverage regressions, Drobetz et al. (2013) included a set of 
macroeconomic and shipping specific macroeconomic indicators in their study of merchant 
shipping companies. Despite the additional variables the explanatory power did not increase 
significantly. Evidence from their study indicates that shipping companies have counter-cyclical 
leverage ratios. The understanding is supported by the significantly negative relationships 
between book leverage and inflation rate, lagged term spread, and annual oil price return. GDP 
growth showed an unexpected positive relationship with leverage. Return on freight rates and 
the Real Trade Weighted US Dollar Index also displayed positive relationships with book 
leverage, while secondhand ship prices were negatively related.  
3.3 Speed of Adjustment 
Drobetz et al. (2013) state that adjustment speeds rely on the trade-off between the cost of 
deviation from the optimal combination of debt and equity and the adjustment cost the 
company faces to achieve the target capital structure. Financially constrained firms are faced 
with a higher cost of adjustment and, therefore, adjust slower towards the target capital 
structure. However, due to high costs of financial distress firms can be expected to adjust faster 
despite even higher adjustment costs.  
Previous research reveals significant variation in the results of adjustment speeds based on the 
chosen measurement method, country of incorporation, and industry. Using a long difference 
panel estimator, Huang and Ritter (2009) calculate yearly adjustment speeds of US corporations 
to vary between 11% and 23% per year. Kayhan and Titman (2007) report adjustment speeds of 
around 10% per year based on the OLS methodology. Flannery and Rangan (2006) find the 
speed of adjustment for US firms to be 30%. Öztekin and Flannery (2012) found that 
adjustment speeds in more developed markets (e.g. more efficient capital markets) could be as 
much as 50% faster. The latter result is in line with expectations, as capital is more costly in the 
presence of market imperfections.  
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Running OLS regressions, Lemmon et al. (2008) found adjustment speeds of 13%-17% for the 
nonfinancial firms listed in the Compustat database. In their study they also used fixed effects 
estimates that showed a significantly faster adjustment speed of 36%-39%. Blundell Bond 
estimators indicated the adjustment speeds were 22%-25%. An important insight from Lemmon 
et al. (2008) is that there is only limited additional information to be obtained by controlling for 
time varying effects, with increased adjustment speeds of just 2-3% per annum.  
For the merchant shipping industry, Drobetz et al. (2013) report adjustment speeds that are 
much higher than for other industries. This could indicate substantial deviation costs due to 
large expected financial distress costs. Their estimates yielded adjustment speeds of 22% and 
42% using an OLS and a fixed effects model respectively. However, when using the Arellano-
Bond estimator their results indicated an adjustment speed of 59%. The corresponding 
adjustment speed generated from the less biased and more reliable Blundell-Bond estimator was 
46.7%3. 
When it comes to macroeconomic conditions and adjustment speeds, Hackbarth et al. (2006), 
Cook and Tang (2010), and Halling et al. (2012) report adjustment speeds that are slower during 
recessions. According to Faulkender et al. (2012), firms are quicker to deleverage when 
experiencing positive shocks than to re-leverage after negative shocks. Drobetz et al. (2013) 
found only slightly slower adjustment speeds during recession than normal economic 
conditions.  
                                                 
3 The details of the Arellano-Bond and Blundell-Bond estimators are outlined in section 5.3 
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4. Regression Variables 
In this section we begin by defining what leverage ratio we will study in our analysis. Then the 
included independent variables on both firm- and macroeconomic levels are defined and 
discussed.  
4.1 Dependent Variable: Leverage 
The choice between market or book leverage, as the applied definition of leverage, has been 
widely discussed in academic literature. On the one hand, a large number of researchers support 
using the market leverage definition when making financial decisions. Welch (2004) argues that 
book leverage is not managerially relevant and that its main use is operating as a plug for the 
balance sheet. Barclay et al. (2006) emphasize that book debt is backward looking, whereas the 
market most often is forward looking. Frank and Goyal (2009) believe that market leverage is 
preferred for the purpose of analyzing companies’ capital structure.  
One the other hand, many scholars argue that book leverage represents the correct 
measurement. Myers (1977) advocates that decision makers should focus on book leverage since 
it is the asset base, and not the outlook for future growth, that is the underlying support for 
debt obligations. Getzmann and Lang (2010) find that since the bias of future expectations are 
excluded the retrospective explanation offered by analyzing book leverage is superior to the 
market value approach. Additionally, Frank and Goyal (2009) report that financial managers 
regard the market leverage measurement as too volatile to function as an appropriate base for 
funding decisions. Specifically for shipbuilders we observe highly volatile market values4. Should 
financial managers make capital structure decisions based on market values, alterations would 
have to be made very often. This can be assumed to be expensive (e.g. listing fees, advisory 
costs). Graham and Harvey (2001) also support the book leverage definition as they found that 
managers do not adjust their funding decisions based on capital market fluctuations. Another 
argument favoring the use of book leverage is that debt’s market value is difficult to reliably 
                                                 
4 The volatile nature of market leverage is assessed in the descriptive statistics of section 6.3.1. 
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Table 4-1: Predictions from a theoretical perspective 
Trade-Off 
Theory
Pecking Order 
Theory
Market Timing 
Theory
Prediction for 
Shipbuilders
Firm Specific Variables:
Taxes + +
Tangiblity + -/+ +
Market to book - + - -
Company Size + - +
Profitability +/- - -
Dividends - +/- -
Asset Risk - + -
Operating Leverage - -
Rating probability + - +
Macroeconomic Indicators:
Macroeconomic Cycles + - - -
Shipyard Specific Indicators + - - -
The table displays the different explanatory variables and the effects the trade-off theory, 
pecking order theory, and the market timing theory are expected to have on a shipyard's 
leverage ratio. For the macroeconomic indicators, a "+" sign indicates pro-cyclical leverage 
ratios, whereas a "-" sign indicates counter-cyclical leverage ratios
quantify. Additionally, it is common to assume that there are negligible differences between the 
absolute book and market values of debt (Koller et al., 2010).  
Considering all the abovementioned factors we base our study on the book leverage definition5. 
Only interest bearing debt is included as we wish to exclude debt types whose costs are 
accounted for in the operating expenses.   
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
4.2 Independent Variables 
This section provides an overview of the independent variables and their theoretical predictions. 
We start by discussing the included firm specific variables and follow up with the 
macroeconomic factors.    
                                                 
5 The regression results using market leverage are provided in the appendix. The regressions based on market leverage yield 
somewhat different results. This is not unexpected, as market leverage is extremely volatile due to the high asset risk.  
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4.2.1 Firm Specific Variables 
Taxes (Corporate Tax Rate) 
Following thoughts from the trade-off theory, the presence of taxes should lead companies to 
take on more leverage as interest payments are tax deductible (Frank & Goyal, 2009). 
Additionally, shipyards would be incentivized to initiate more projects in the presence of a 
higher tax rate. This is because the downside is reduced due to the ability to carry forward tax-
losses. However, empirical findings are not consistent with the trade-off theory regarding the 
effect of taxes. Frank and Goyals (2009) find tax effects hard to assess when studying capital 
structure determinants. Hennesy and Whited (2005) report that transaction costs make the 
effect from taxes difficult to empirically identify although they are a part of the company’s 
funding decision. Frank and Goyal (2009) provide a range of measures suitable for detecting the 
effect of taxes on corporate financial decisions such as top tax rate, investment tax credits in 
relation to assets, net operational carryforwards, and depreciations to assets. We have chosen 
the top tax rate/statutory corporate tax rate as our independent variable. In line with the trade-
off theory, we posit that shipbuilders’ leverage ratios should be positively influenced by the 
statutory tax rate.  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 = 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
Tangibility 
The trade-off theory implies that companies with identifiable and tangible assets have lower 
bankruptcy costs. Asset tangibility makes the value of a company transparent and reduces 
information asymmetry, making it easier for outsiders to value the firm correctly (Drobetz et al., 
2013). Thus, one can expect a higher degree of asset tangibility to lead to a higher leverage ratio. 
However, Harris and Raviv (1991) argue that the cost of equity is reduced when there is less 
information asymmetry. This is more in line with the pecking order theory and should lead to 
lower debt levels. Frank and Goyal (2009) claim there exists ambiguity in the pecking order 
theory when the adverse selection costs are connected to the assets in place. Under those 
circumstances one would expect to see higher debt levels when tangibility increases. Following 
findings from Frank and Goyal (2009) we propose a positive relationship between tangibility 
and leverage for the shipbuilders.   
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦, 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 (𝑃𝑃&𝐸)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
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Market to Book (Growth Opportunities) 
The trade-off theory predicts that firms experiencing and expecting high growth, face increased 
costs from agency problems related to debt and elevated financial distress costs (Myers, 1977). 
Thus, one would expect a negative relationship between growth and leverage. However, the 
pecking order theory implies that constant profits will lead growth opportunities to have a 
positive impact on leverage ratios. When new investments eventually exceed retained earnings a 
company will start financing through debt, which increases the debt-ratio (Frank & Goyal, 
2009). Drobetz et al. (2013) report that most empirical findings coincide with the expectations 
from the trade-off theory. They also state that a company’s market to book ratio serves well to 
capture the impact from expected growth opportunities. Market timing theory says that a high 
market to book ratio would give managers incentives to reduce the company’s debt level (Frank 
& Goyal, 2009). This is because equity issuances are relatively cheap for existing shareholders. 
In line with previous studies supporting the trade-off theory, we hypothesize that shipbuilders 
will experience a negative relationship between the market to book ratio and leverage.  
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Size 
Higher operational transparency is often associated with larger firms. From a pecking order 
perspective this will lower the cost of equity issuances and supports lower debt levels. However, 
Frank and Goyal (2009) argue that large and diversified firms face lower risks of default. Mature 
firms are more often recognized in the capital markets, which reduce their debt-related agency 
costs. Based on the trade-off theory, company size should exert a positive influence on the 
leverage ratio. Drobetz et al. (2013) comment that empirical findings support the trade-off 
theory. We measure company size by the natural logarithm of the total value of book assets and 
decide to follow the trade-off theory’s prediction of a positive correlation between leverage and 
size.  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 = ln (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 
Profitability 
The pecking order theory posits that companies with high profits have lower leverage ratios 
because internal funds are preferred over external funds. This is well illustrated when holding 
dividends and investments constant, as growing profits would finance an ever-increasing part of 
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the operations. On the contrary, trade-off theory states that profitable firms have a higher debt 
capacity and require higher levels of debt in order to discipline management (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Frank and Goyal (2009) make the argument that a dynamic trade-off theory 
could lead companies to have lower debt ratios, as leverage can be negatively related to profits 
due to different market frictions (e.g. passive accumulation of profits). The pecking order 
perspective has received the most empirical support and following this we expect profitability to 
be negatively correlated with leverage for our shipbuilders.  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝐵𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡, 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Dividend Payer 
Many firms attempt to maintain a constant dividend pay-out ratio and this affects their capital 
structure decisions (Johnsen, 2012). The pecking order theory does not explicitly predict a 
consistent relationship between leverage and the dividend status of a company (Drobetz et al. 
2013). Initially one would expect dividend-paying firms to issue more debt since it is preferred 
to equity as a source of financing. However, dividends are disciplining to the firm’s management 
and reduce information asymmetries, which could lead to more equity. From a trade-off 
perspective this implies lower leverage. Findings from studies done on other industries have 
shown that dividend payers have lower debt levels than their counterparties (Frank & Goyal, 
2009; Drobetz et al., 2013). Accordingly, we expect the same effect for globally listed 
shipbuilders.  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑠 > 0 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑖 
Asset Risk 
As outlined by Drobetz et al. (2013) the financial distress costs increase with the volatility of a 
firm’s assets. The type of shipbuilding orders can change quickly from one type of ships to 
another (Stopford, 2012), which should result in increased volatility for specialized firms. 
Additionally, specialized vessels should have less functioning second hand markets, given that 
their area of usage cannot easily be expanded to new freight areas. This should further elevate 
the asset risk. Certain assets can be temporary illiquid and hard to redeploy under difficult 
macroeconomic conditions. Following the trade-off theory asset risk should relate negatively 
with leverage. The pecking order theory suggests that higher adverse selection costs associated 
with asset volatility will lead managers to choose higher levels of debt. Evidence for the impact 
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of asset risk on leverage ratios is scarce. Gropp and Heider (2010) and Drobetz et al. (2013) 
found asset risk to exert a negative impact on book leverage. In line with Frank and Goyal 
(2009) and Drobetz et al. (2013)’s definition, we use the unlevered volatility of stock returns as 
our measure of asset risk and expect to see a negative relationship with leverage.  
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑈𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 =  𝜎𝑢
= 𝜎𝑙 ∗
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  
Operating Leverage  
Drobetz et al. (2013) posit that operational leverage complements asset risk when measuring a 
firm’s risk. The operating risk of a firm increases with the size of the fixed production costs. 
With high financial leverage, operating leverage should be comparatively lower when following 
the trade-off theory. Previous literature shows that leverage relates negatively to operating 
leverage in capital-intensive industries such as shipping (Drobetz et al., 2013) and REITs 
(Harrison et al., 2011). Given the similarities between shipbuilding and the industries mentioned 
above we expect to see a negative connection between operating and financial leverage.  
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 =
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Rating Probability (Supply of Debt Capital) 
Firms are constrained in their access to capital markets and are rationed by investors (Stiglitz & 
Weiss, 1981). Restrictions to enter debt capital markets are widely acknowledged in academia. 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) state that a company can be categorized with a high debt 
capacity if it is credit rated. A credit rated company should experience less difficulties of raising 
debt, both in terms volume and spread. Credit ratings are positively related to leverage from a 
trade-off theory perspective. The pecking order theory predicts that ratings could potentially 
decrease the debt ratio, since lower information asymmetries lead to decreased equity issuance 
costs (Drobetz et al., 2013). 
Not all firms receive a credit rating and thus Lemmon and Zender (2010) criticize using them as 
leverage ratio predictors. They argue that firms may intentionally exclude debt issues from their 
financing decisions. Therefore, some firms do not possess a credit rating even though they are 
equally capable of utilizing the debt markets as companies already holding a credit rating. An 
approach to minimize this bias used in recent academic papers, such as Lemmon and Zender 
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(2010) and Drobetz et al. (2013), is to estimate the probability a firm has of obtaining a rating 
given a set of firm-specific characteristics. Size, profitability, tangibility, market to book, age, 
share of research and development expenses to sales, volatility of stock returns, and industry of 
the company are the predictors used to compose a rating probability with a logistic regression6. 
Increased rating probability creates easier access to debt capital markets and we hypothesize that 
shipbuilders will experience higher leverage ratios given this development.  
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
1
1 + 𝑒−(𝛽𝑜+𝛽𝑖∗𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑖)
 
4.2.2 Macroeconomic Factors 
Macroeconomic conditions heavily influence the shipping industry (Stopford, 2009). Drobetz et 
al. (2013) promote that the capital need of the shipping industry is a consequence of the demand 
for seaborne trade. The sensitivity towards macroeconomic conditions is transferable to the 
shipyards given their role as suppliers to the shipping industry. To illustrate the possible 
influence of macroeconomic conditions, we introduce macroeconomic factors as potential 
determinants in the examination of shipbuilders’ capital structure. Accompanied by other capital 
structure studies, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Drobetz et al. (2013) provide precedence for 
performing regressions which include both level and return based variables simultaneously. As 
such, we feel confident in adopting their approach.  
Leverage and Economic Cycles 
We use indicator variables to isolate the effects of general economic cycles. Two dummies are 
included in the regressions; (1) the industrial growth of the Pacific region and (2) the state of 
shipping market7. Total economic output consists of both services and goods, but only the latter 
are transported physically. Additionally, several countries located in the pacific region have large 
industrial sectors (e.g. China accounts for approximately one fifth of the world’s manufacturing 
(the Economist, 2012)). Thus, it is fair to assume that the industrial production growth of the 
                                                 
6 Rebekka Haller and Wolfgang Drobetz provided us with the results of the rating probability logit regression of their study. The 
regression is based on data from a comprehensive sample of firms in G20 (a total of 244,380 observations) retrieved from 
Compustat.  
7 The industrial growth of the pacific region is collected from Clarksons (Clarksons, 2014h) and is set equal to 0 when the 
growth rate is positive, and 1 in the case of negative growth. The resulting periods of recessions are 1998, 2001, and 2009. The 
shipping dummies are collected from Drobetz et al. (2013), which constitutes the periods from 1998-2002 and 2009-2013.  
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Pacific region may influence shipbuilders’ capital structure decisions. Considering the shipping 
market, the demand for ships ultimately depends on the demand for seaborne trade. Thus, the 
economic state of the shipping market should influence shipbuilders’ corporate financial 
decisions.  Halling et al. (2012) support the prediction of a counter-cyclical leverage ratio due to 
firms’ market timing behavior. Pecking order theory argues that less debt will be issued in good 
economic times since the firms experience stronger cash flows and generate more internal 
funds. Firms will also be induced to issue securities that are less information sensitive during 
poor macroeconomic conditions. However, higher bankruptcy costs combined with lower 
taxable income and cash flows favor a pro-cyclical leverage-ratio according to the trade-off 
theory (Frank & Goyal, 2009). In line with Halling et al. (2012) and Drobetz et al. (2013), we 
expect shipbuilders’ leverage ratios to also exhibit a counter-cyclical behavior.  
For the standard macroeconomic indicators we adopt a similar set of variables as Ferson and 
Harvey (1994) and Drobetz et al. (2013). To account for market cyclicality we include the lagged 
term spread, which is calculated through subtracting a 1-year from a 10-year US treasury bill. 
One can argue that a tight term spread is a predictor of recessions (Dahlquist & Harvey, 2001). 
A negative relationship between leverage and the lagged term spread would, thus, be in support 
of a counter-cyclical leverage ratio. A positive coefficient would favour a pro-cyclical leverage 
ratio and is consistent with the trade-off theory. For our shipbuilding companies we expect a 
negative relationship, which is in line with the shipping industry’s counter-cyclical leverage 
ratios.  
The real growth rate of the G7 countries’ aggregated gross domestic product (GDP) is included 
as a benchmark for the direction and state of the global economy. This particular proxy was 
preferred to others to make our findings comparable with previous studies such as Drobetz et. 
al. (2013). During boom periods shipowners tend to order new ships despite having available 
capacity within the overall fleet, as they are hoping to take advantages of the prosperous 
earnings potential (Stopford, 2009). Accordingly, the rate of GDP growth is expected to have an 
impact on the leverage ratios of the shipbuilding industry. A positive coefficient is in line with 
the trade-off theory, whereas the opposite is expected under the pecking order theory. 
Following the empirical observations of counter-cyclical leverage ratios, we expect a negative 
coefficient for the GDP growth.  
A positive return on the Brent Crude oil price can indicate a booming economy, but also be a 
result of extraordinary events related to the oil industry. The recent high oil prices have 
increased the focus on cost efficiency amongst ship-owners (Fearnleys, 2014). As they undergo 
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measures to lower their bunker costs they are more likely to order new and more efficient ships, 
ultimately affecting the capital structure decisions of shipbuilders. At the same time exogenous 
factors can also cause oil price changes. For example, the Arab spring in 2011 significantly drove 
up oil prices worldwide (Blas, 2011) despite that the overall world economy was only just 
recovering from the 2008-2009 recession. This creates ambiguity in relation to which underlying 
factors drive the coefficient of the Brent Crude oil price return. Regardless of the underlying 
reason for an oil price change, we can assume that it will affect the shipbuilders’ capital structure 
decisions. However, predicting a general explicit direction of the relationship will be imprecise 
unless we know the underlying reason. Thus, we offer an ex-post interpretation of the 
relationship between the return on the Brent Crude oil price and leverage ratios.  
The annual return on the MSCI World Index is also included. Given that high stock price 
returns are results of correct stock pricing, they should be accompanied with increased internal 
funds available to finance operations. In the presence of a pecking order leverage should then 
be lower when stock returns are higher. The trade-off theory implies the opposite to be true as 
higher free cash flows can result in increased agency costs and firms would issue more debt to 
discipline management. Following the expectation of a counter-cyclical behavior we expect a 
negative relationship between leverage and the return of the MSCI index.  
Shipbuilding Specific Indicators 
We include four return based shipbuilding industry specific variables: the Clarkson Newbuilding 
Price Index, the world orderbook in terms of value, the world deliveries measured in DWT, and 
the Real Trade Weighted US Dollar Index: Major Currencies.  
The return on the Clarksons Newbuilding Price Index directly affects investment decisions of 
shipping investors because the level influences supply and alters financial flexibility as more 
investors are attracted to prosperous periods compared to depressed times. Thus, the index also 
affects the capital structure decisions for shipbuilders. Given that higher vessel prices are 
resulting from increased demand as opposed to higher input factor costs, an increase in the 
index indicates a boom period for shipbuilders. A positive relationship between the price index 
return and leverage ratio implies that shipbuilder’s act based on the trade-off theory. Observing 
a negative coefficient indicates that the pecking order theory is dominant. However, it must be 
noted that increased vessel prices could be expected to affect demand negatively as some 
shipowners may find new vessels too expensive and rather keep their existing fleet. All factors 
considered we hypothesize a negative relationship between leverage and the price index.  
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The orderbook value is directly connected to all shipyards as a highly tangible measure of how 
much work each shipbuilder has contracted. Increasing values of the orderbook entail more 
secure operations for the shipbuilder and indicate a positive market development. A negative 
coefficient in front of the orderbook change favors the counter-cyclical prediction of the 
pecking order theory. On the contrary, it must be noted that an increase in orderbook could be 
the result of delays or postponed deliveries due to requests from the customers. Given that the 
postponement is the result of a downward market trend, as opposed to an individual customer’s 
failure to serve the requirements of their shipbuilding contract, a negative coefficient would be 
in line with a pro-cyclical leverage ratio. The empirical findings of Drobetz et al. (2013) showed 
counter-cyclical leverage ratios for the shipping companies. Overall we hypothesize a counter-
cyclical leverage ratio for shipbuilders, but since the interpretation of the orderbook value holds 
an inherent ambiguity we will give an ex-post assessment.  
Given that shipbuilders are dependent on a continuous flow of work to optimize operations, the 
change in new orders is an alternative measure for the developments covered by the change in 
world orderbook. However, the change in new contracts only accounts for new business, 
whereas the change in the overall orderbook includes information about all operations and past 
influences. Accordingly, we decide to use the return on the world orderbook. Nevertheless, we 
acknowledge that the new orders variable can provide an equally good measure.  
The relationship between book leverage and return on world deliveries is ambiguous. Generally, 
we hypothesize that shipbuilders experience counter-cyclical leverage ratios. Two different 
interpretations can be presented depending on the sign of the observed coefficient of world 
deliveries. On the one hand, a positive relationship can imply that shipbuilders are positive with 
regards to earnings outlook from an increase in aggregated deliveries. On the other hand, a 
negative relationship could entail that a potential capacity increase in the overall fleet from an 
upturn in deliveries would mean that the shipbuilders face tougher market conditions in the 
future. Given the ambiguity, we will offer an ex-post interpretation of the change in deliveries 
and its relationship to book leverage.  
The Real Trade Weighted US Dollar Index: Major Currencies represents the value of the US 
dollar against seven currencies that are widespread outside the country of issuance8 (St Louis 
                                                 
8 The countries included in the Real Trade Weighted US Dollar Index: Major Currencies are the Euro Area, Canada, Japan, 
United Kingdom, Sweden, Switzerland, and Australia. 
 33 
Fed, 2014). An increase in the index entails that a larger amount of foreign exchange is required 
to buy US dollars. We include this measure because foreign exchange is of vast importance to 
shipyards worldwide. Shipowners often demand that the contracts on loans provided are 
denominated in a currency of their choosing, which most likely is the US dollar (European 
Commission, 2003). Stopford (2009) highlights that most shipyards’ competitiveness are 
negatively exposed to the value of the US dollar. When the US Dollar index increases, the 
shipyards should respond by increasing their leverage ratios. This is given that they follow the 
pecking order’s dynamic of counter-cyclical leverage ratios. Following Stopford (2009) and our 
former prediction of counter-cyclical leverage ratios, shipbuilders should experience a positive 
relationship between leverage and the return of the US dollar index.  
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5. Methodology 
5.1 Ordinary Least Squares Multiple Regression 
A multiple regression model is a well-suited tool to explain the value of one dependent variable 
based on a set of independent variables. Stock and Watson (2012) outline the characteristics of 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) model. In contrast to a regression with one explanatory variable, 
a multiple regression model increasingly explains the variance of the predicted values, as more 
independent factors are included. Equation 1 illustrates the general multiple regression formula, 
where 𝛽0 is the constant value, 𝛽1, … , 𝛽𝑛 are the isolated effects on the predicted value 𝑦, and 𝜀 
is the error term.  
(1) 𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖 + 𝜀 
The coefficients are estimated by minimizing the errors between the predicted ŷ and y.  
(2) ∑ (𝑌𝑖 − 𝛽𝑜 − 𝛽1𝑥1𝑖 − ⋯ − 𝛽𝑛𝑥𝑛𝑖)
2𝑛
𝑖=1  
For an ordinary OLS model to be valid, the conditions of linearity, normality, homoscedasticity, 
multicollinearity, and autocorrelation must be fulfilled9.  
When assessing a regression model it is important to be aware of the possible omitted variable 
bias (Stock & Watson, 2012). Two conditions must be fulfilled for the omitted variable bias to 
occur: (A) if the omitted variable correlates with the regressor and (B) if the omitted variable is 
part of determining the independent variable. The effect of the omitted variables will be 
captured in the error term, and thus including more omitted variables into the model will 
increase its explanatory power (Stock & Watson, 2012).  
5.2 Fixed and Random Effects Models 
A fixed effect model allows 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 (Wooldridge, 2009), making it a powerful tool 
for analyzing panel data (Stock & Watson, 2012)10. If all variables occur for each time-period 
                                                 
9 For the interested reader these conditions are outlined in the appendix. 
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and entity the panel data is balanced. An unbalanced panel data set includes missing data points. 
Introducing fixed effects allows to adjust for either unobserved effects that vary across entities, 
but are constant over time, or effects that are constant across entities, but vary over time. The 
adjustment can also be made for both simultaneously. The fixed effect regression model can be 
illustrated as: 
(3) 𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋1,𝑖𝑡 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
where 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑛; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇; 𝑋𝑛,𝑖𝑡 is the value of the n
th regressor for entity 𝑖 in time period 
𝑡, and 𝛼1, … , 𝛼𝑛 and 𝜆1, … , 𝜆𝑡 are the specific intercepts for the entities/time-periods (i.e. 
dummy variables). In order to avoid the dummy variable trap of perfect multicollinearity, only 
𝑛 − 1 and 𝑡 − 1 dummy variables are included for the respective categories.  
Where the fixed effect model allows 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0, a random effects model requires 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0. Zero correlation between the independent variables and the error term can 
be observed when one has controlled for all factors that may influence the dependent variable 
or when the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is very small (Wooldridge, 2009). The random effects model 
provides the chance of estimating the effect from the explanatory variables that are constant 
over time and still account for unobserved individual specific effects (Balsvik, 2012).  
To determine which model is best suited one can perform a Hausman test (Wooldridge, 2009). 
The test checks to see if 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0. When 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑘,𝑖𝑡, 𝑢𝑖𝑡) = 0 both the random and 
fixed effect results will be consistent. The main difference is found in the standard deviation, 
which will be significantly smaller for the random-effect model (Wooldridge, 2009). If the 
circumstances allow it, using the random-effects model is preferable. However, when the 
unobserved effect 𝑢𝑖𝑡 correlates with at least one of the explanatory variables the fixed effect 
model provides superior results.  
5.3 Speed of Adjustment Estimators 
In an assessment of the determinants of capital structure for shipbuilders, it is interesting to 
estimate how quickly the sample companies adjust when there is a deviation between the current 
                                                                                                                                                      
10 Panel data means that one has observation for 𝑛 different entities for t different time-periods 
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and the optimal capital structure. Drobetz et al. (2013) outlines the econometric specifications 
to assess the speed of adjustment, a methodology that has become increasingly popular in recent 
capital structure research. 
(4) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝜆(𝐿𝑖,𝑡
∗ − 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
The change in leverage is dependent on 𝜆 (the adjustment speed) and how far the leverage ratio 
in the last period 𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 was from the target leverage ratio 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
∗ . 𝜆 = 0 represents no adjustment, 
whereas a 𝜆 = 1 entails a full adjustment in the first period following a shock. The target 
leverage-ratio 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
∗  is dependent on a set of factors relevant to the firm, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡. Through rearranging 
equation 4 and substituting 𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 for 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
∗ , the following equation is reached:  
(5) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 
𝑋𝑖,𝑡 is the vector of firm-specific leverage factors that are to be determined through an OLS-
regression model and 𝛽 is a vector of coefficients.  An OLS estimator will be biased upwards 
because it omits fixed effects (Nickell, 1981). Thus, the error term 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 is divided between 
Gaussian white noise 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 and a firm-fixed effect 𝛼𝑖. 
(6) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 
Research from Baltagi (2005) says that a fixed effect (FE) estimator will not completely remove 
the bias of unobserved heterogeneity. Lagged leverage 𝐿𝑡−1 correlates with the part of the 
regression residuals related to the firm’s fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 and the error term 𝛿𝑖,𝑡. The time-
invariant effect can be removed by instrumenting the variables using the Arellano Bond (AB) 
(1991) difference generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. This estimator allows all 
lagged estimators to be used as instruments and will be unbiased when the residuals are free 
from second order serial correlation.  
(7) Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + Δ𝛿𝑖,𝑡 
The AB estimator can become problematic when the instruments provide little information 
about why the leverage changes. Consequently, Blundell Bond (BB) (1998) introduced the 
system GMM-estimator. Not only does it include the difference equation (8), but it also includes 
the level equation (9). 
(8) Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)Δ𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽Δ𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + Δ𝛿𝑖,𝑡 
(9) 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 = (1 − 𝜆)𝐿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜆𝛽𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 
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According to Drobetz et al. (2013) the lagged first difference variables prove as valid 
instruments for equation 8. The same is true for equation 9 when using the lagged independent 
variables. As the BB-estimator allows for more instruments the efficiency can increase 
dramatically (Roodman, 2009). It must be noted that when the lagged variables’ coefficients are 
close to unity or when second order serial correlation is present, a BB estimator will still be 
biased (Huang & Ritter, 2009; Flannery & Hankins, 2012).  
A valid GMM estimator model must fulfil two criteria to provide valid results: (1) no second 
order autocorrelation and (2) exogenous instruments. In order to verify unaccounted 
autocorrelation in the fixed effects one can use the Arellano Bond (AR) tests. The test assumes 
no autocorrelation in the residuals as its null hypothesis (Roodman, 2009). In a valid model one 
expects first order correlation in differences, but second order correlation should be absent. 
Regarding the second criteria of exogenous instruments, it is possible to utilize the 
Sargans/Hansen-test for overridden restrictions (Stock & Watson, 2012). The results of the 
model should be interpreted with caution if the null hypothesis of truly exogenous instruments 
is rejected. 
GMM estimators are best intended for panel data that have a large number of groups N 
compared to periods T (Roodman, 2009). There is no definition of what size defines a large 
group, but panel data with less than 20 groups may become worrisome. A too small N can make 
the Arellano Bond test for autocorrelation and the clustered standard errors unreliable. With a 
smaller number of groups, chances are that the number of instruments can approach the 
number of observations as the instrument counts quadratic in T. Too many instruments can be 
limited by collapsing them (Roodman, 2009).  
There are many potential biases associated with speed of adjustment estimates and in line with 
Drobetz et al. (2013) we will outline two potential biases. Debt ratios are in the interval of 0 to 
1, which econometric estimators assume is due to mean reversion. Thus, even when corporate 
financial decisions are made randomly the speed of adjustment estimators can be positive 
(Chang & Dasgupta, 2009). Additionally, the use of leverage ratios will bring speed of 
adjustment biases upward (Iliev & Welch, 2010). Roodman (2009) states that as indicated by 
Sargan statistic with p-value equal to one, a large number of instruments compared to the 
number of observation will lead to biased estimates.  
 38 
The speed of adjustment, 𝜆, is given by one minus the coefficient of the lagged leverage ratio 
𝐿𝑡−1 (Drobetz et al., 2013). A more tangible measure of 𝜆 is the half-life of deviation from 
target leverage, which is given by
log(0.5)
𝐿𝑜𝑔(1−𝜆)
.   
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Country Companies Sum of #
Bermuda 2 27
China 3 34
India 2 20
Japan 4 64
Norway 2 15
Singapore 2 25
South Korea 7 93
Taiwan 1 7
Grand Total 23 285
The table displays the firm year observations and the number of firms in the data sample according to incorporation 
country. Overall, the sample consists of 23 globally listed shipyards, with annual data retreived from ThomsonOne 
(Worldscope). Country of incorporation is based on Bloomberg.
Table 6-1: Firm years and shipyards by country of incorporation 
6. Data  
In this section we first describe the data sample and elaborate on our data gathering process. 
Then we discuss the limitations of the representativeness of our sample. Further on descriptive 
statistics are provided for both the firm specific variables and macroeconomic variables.  
6.1 Data Sampling Process 
Our sample consists of 23 listed shipbuilding companies, generating 285 firm year observations 
in the timeframe between 1997 and 2013. Financial statements are collected through 
ThomsonOne/Worldscope11 on an annual basis12 and converted into US dollars for 
comparability. In wider terms the shipbuilding industry includes companies that build ships 
and/or contribute the necessary supplies and facilitate services to complete shipbuilding 
activities. Shipbuilding is a versatile industry and the companies differ greatly. To compile a 
refined and appropriate sample of companies, a narrower definition of shipbuilding was chosen 
for our study. Thus, the selection criteria to be included in our sample were a public listing and 
                                                 
11 In the situation of an incomplete financial statement derived from ThomsonOne – the missing data was filled in manually 
from Bloomberg. However, all sourced from Worldscope.  
12 Reporting of a fiscal year differs in certain accounting standards. If the fiscal year ends 31.03, we have chosen to include the 
statement as a reflection of the previous calendar year. If the fiscal year ends 31.12 the statements are included as the current 
year.  
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that the shipbuilders primary operation was building ships for commercial trade. Further we 
have required that all firm year observations have non-missing data for total book assets.  
Our initial selection of companies was decided from a comprehensive list of internationally 
listed shipbuilding companies available through Bloomberg. The list was compared with 
company descriptions from ThomsonOne. Thirty-five false listings, e.g. naval companies, 
personal leisure boat builders, military shipyards or shipping companies, included in the 
Bloomberg list were excluded. Following this professor Roar Os Ådland validated our list, 
which lead to the exclusion of thirteen additional companies that were not primarily involved in 
shipbuilding. An example of such a company is ES Group whose activities are firstly supply 
functions and secondary shipbuilding. The final data sample contains both newer companies, 
with only 4 years of financial statements (i.e. China Shipbuilding Industry Company) and older 
traditional shipyards such as Hyundai Heavy Industries. 
For the macroeconomic input factors we demanded that the chosen source provided both 
reliable and up-to-date information. Generally, Clarksons has been our primary source of 
shipbuilding specific information such as the Newbuilding Price Index, deliveries and 
orderbook. The Brent Crude oil price and the Pacific region’s industrial production were also 
gathered from Clarksons. For equity capital markets our source was Datastream. American 
government agencies, such as the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, were chosen to provide the data for the term spread and the 
Real Trade Weighted US Dollar Index: Major Currencies. The shipping recessions are collected 
from Drobetz et al. (2013).  
6.2 Representativeness of Data Sample 
Since our final sample consists of 23 companies one can question how representative our 
selection is for the overall shipbuilding industry. The somewhat limited number of observations 
is the major drawback of our study and we acknowledge that it could potentially influence the 
results. In addition to this we have chosen to only include listed shipbuilders due to the ease of 
access to financial accounting information. This criterion has excluded some large players (e.g. 
Italian Fincantieri).  
Despite the sample size, we have indications that our sample is representative for the total 
industry. Our selected companies are overrepresented amongst the strongest and largest 
shipbuilders. As of April 2014, seven of our included yards rank as global top ten shipyards in 
 41 
Percentiles
Obs. Mean SD Median 25th 75th Min Max
Book Leverage 285 0.226 0.160 0.213 0.094 0.336 0.000 0.765
Market Leverage 267 0.752 2.854 0.561 0.113 0.873 -14.408 39.653
Operating Leverage 285 0.640 0.284 0.658 0.454 0.817 0.000 1.737
Tangibility 285 0.285 0.126 0.297 0.201 0.358 0.000 0.631
Market to book 267 0.542 0.636 0.438 0.268 0.646 -0.391 6.088
Book Assets (USDm) 285 1 346 5 987 423 5 953 6 49 935
Profitability 285 0.054 0.074 0.062 0.032 0.088 -0.430 0.256
Dividend Payer 285 0.670 0.471 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Asset Risk 262 0.512 1.535 0.382 0.187 0.618 -10.275 15.819
Rating Probability 258 0.176 0.227 0.043 0.010 0.287 0.000 0.999
Company Age 285 40.4 23.4 37.0 27.0 50.0 2.0 101.0
Corporate Tax Rate 285 0.279 0.121 0.280 0.242 0.340 0.000 0.516
The table displays the number of firm-year observations, the mean, the standard deviation, the median, the 25th and 
75th percentile, as well as the minimum and the maximum of each factor. All data are unwinsorized, raw data.
Table 6-2: Firm specific descriptive statistics 
terms of orderbook and combined they hold approximately 27% of the total world orderbook 
volume (Clarksons, 2014a). In terms of geographical location our sample is somewhat skewed 
towards Asia. Asian shipbuilders possess 91% of the world’s orderbook (Clarksons, 2014a). For 
our sample Asian companies own approximately 99% of the combined orderbooks, indicating 
the slight skew. However, in terms of the number of companies our sample has a split of 91% 
Asian and 9% European shipbuilders.  
All factors considered we believe our sample to be a representative illustration of the 
shipbuilding industry. However, the reader should bare in mind the concerns regarding the 
sample size when assessing the results.  
6.3 Descriptive Statistics 
6.3.1 Firm Spesific Descriptive Statistics  
Previous research on similar capital structure determinants have been conducted in both related 
and unrelated industries. In order to provide a more holistic picture of our data, results and 
observations from Frank and Goyal (2009) on the US Market, Bessler et al. (2013) for the G7 
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Figure 6-1: Shipyards' median and mean leverage ratios. Data sourced from 
ThomsonOne/Worldscope 
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firms and Drobetz et al. (2013) will be used as benchmarks for our discussion of the descriptive 
statistics13.  
 
Observations regarding the leverage ratios are of essential importance to this study and will be 
thoroughly examined. For our sample the mean book- and market leverage indicate that there 
are large differences between book and market measures. There is also heterogeneity in the 
observed leverage ratios within each measure. Some firm year observations have no book debt, 
whereas the maximum book leverage observation is 0.76. The equivalent figures for the market 
leverage show an even more extreme variation. The year 2011 holds the observation of 
maximum market leverage, which belongs to Guangzhou Shipyard International Company Ltd. 
Due to unexplained company specific events the firms market leverage increased with 
2,768.07% going from 2010 to 2011, before it decreased by 98.43% in 2012. The extreme 
variation in the market leverage seems unreasonable and makes the measure an unreliable 
representation of the true target leverage ratio of the shipbuilders in our sample14. When 
assessing the medians we observe a closer relationship between the development of book and 
market leverage, which gives further support to the existence of outliers within the leverage 
ratios.  
                                                 
13 As a comparative benchmark for our sample we have, in line with Bessler et al. (2013), chosen to use the characteristics of a 
sample of G7 firms. In short the sample contains 233,146 firm-year observations and the estimation period is from 1989 to 
2010.  
14 Data on Guangzhou Shipyard International Company Ltd from Bloomberg indicate that there may be a false data entry in 
ThomsonOne/Worldscope in 2011. However, we cannot be absolutely certain of this, as Bloomberg reports the accounting 
measures somewhat differently from ThomsonOne/Worldscope on a general basis.  
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Total
Book Leverage 0.042 0.150 0.265 0.446 0.226
Market Leverage -0.309 0.353 0.711 2.276 0.752
Operating Leverage 0.278 0.564 0.734 0.986 0.640
Tangibility 0.120 0.255 0.323 0.440 0.285
Market to book 0.078 0.360 0.530 1.202 0.542
Size 5.119 6.480 7.908 9.303 7.205
Profitability -0.032 0.049 0.073 0.124 0.054
Asset Risk -0.367 0.277 0.498 1.655 0.512
The table displays the quartile means of the different independent variables. All variables are raw, unwinzorized data
Table 6-3: Quartile means by firm specific variable 
 
Table 6-3 gives an overview of the observations sorted into quartile portfolios for each variable 
and the large differences within the market based variables become increasingly apparent. Based 
on the large market fluctuations, the median book and market leverage might be better 
representations of the industry’s target leverage than the mean values. Compared to 
shipbuilders, the listed shipping companies studied by Drobetz et al. (2013) experience a higher 
mean book leverage of 0.407, but a lower mean market leverage of 0.386. The shipbuilding 
industry experiences similar leverage levels as the G7 firms presented by Bessler et al. (2013).  
Shipbuilders in our sample have substantially lower average and median operating leverages than 
the G7 firms, who experience an average operating leverage of 1.07. Given our previous 
observation that shipbuilders experience similar financial leverages as the G7 firms, this 
becomes an interesting characteristic of the shipbuilding industry. Kavussanos and Visvikis 
(2006) state that within the shipping industry the convention is high financial and operating 
leverage. Our observations seem contrary to this, but in line with recent findings by Drobetz et 
al. (2013) from the merchant shipping industry.  
 
Shipbuilders display a modest degree of tangibility during our sample period. This is roughly in 
line with the standard in both the US markets and other G7 countries, whose mean values are 
0.34 and 0.29 respectively. The observation is quite surprising as shipbuilding is a regarded 
capital-intensive industry and we expected the level of PP&E to be higher. A possible 
explanation could be that ships in progress, which constitute a large share of shipbuilders’ 
capital costs, are capitalized as work in progress and not PP&E (European Commission, 2009).  
 
The market to book ratio indicates that the shipbuilding companies achieved poor average 
market valuations during our sample period. While the trend of poor evaluation seems true for 
the 1st to 3rd quartiles, the 4th quartile including some of the strongest and most trusted 
companies, have an average level of 1.202. A general conclusion is that even the most 
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prosperous shipyards are regarded as having fewer growth and earnings opportunities than the 
average G7 company, whose valuation is 1.7 times book value of assets.  
 
Observations regarding the book assets exert a sample including both extremely large and 
somewhat smaller shipbuilders. The most extreme example is Hyundai Heavy Industries that 
hold book assets valued at $49.93 billion. This is large for a shipbuilder, but can be explained by 
the fact that the company is a conglomerate including several other operations besides 
shipbuilding.  
 
Historically shipbuilding has experienced large increases in profitability through technological 
innovations reducing the construction time of vessels (Lutz, 1980). Despite continuous 
innovation throughout most of our sample period (Michel & Noble, 2008), the shipyards’ 
profitability is rather poor. The shipbuilders experienced worse profitability than both the 
average G7 firm and the merchant shipping companies. However, the observation is in line with 
the documented high asset risk and the depressed market valuations represented by the market 
to book ratios. The results are again somewhat heterogeneous as the highest quartile portfolio’s 
profitability exceeds the average company within the G7. Low profitability should affect the 
shipbuilder’s attractiveness to investors, and as such the composition of their capital structure.  
 
Up to 67% of the shipyards in our sample are dividend payers. As such, we would expect to 
observe few indications of free cash flow problems among shipbuilders. Shipbuilders do, 
however, pay dividends more seldom than their merchant shipping peers. Assuming that 
dividends are related to financial constraints, a high amount of dividend payments indicate 
unconstrained companies (Fazzari et al., 1988; Denis & Sibilkov, 2010).   
 
The average asset risk for our sample is considerably higher than the US market risk of 0.13 or 
the G7 sample value of 0.113. Shipbuilders operate in a narrower industry than the average 
stock market company. Asset risk is the single variable that has the greatest variation across all 
four quartile portfolios15. Our sample is substantially more volatile than merchant shipping 
companies, indicating that shipbuilders might be more sensitive towards general 
macroeconomic conditions. The asset risk associated with different ship types should vary 
                                                 
15 The average asset risk is negative for the 1st quartile of observations, which is due to the presence of negative enterprise 
values.  
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depending on both the volume and existence of a well functioning second hand marked. 
Common types of ships can be assumed to carry a lower risk than more specialized vessels, as 
the latter are most likely harder to re-sell. Therefore, it is expected that the asset risk of our 
sample is volatile given the heterogeneity of shipbuilders included in terms of orderbooks and 
product specializations.  
 
The mean rating probability for a shipbuilders is higher than that of the average G7 firm, which 
according to Bessler et al. (2013) has a rating probability of 0.121. Compared to the shipping 
firms of Drobetz et al (2013), the shipbuilders have a slightly lower probability of obtaining a 
rating. The upper 25th percentiles’ averages are approximately the same for shipping and 
shipbuilding companies. Drobetz et al. (2013) infers that about one fourth of the shipping 
companies are unconstrained, and as such the same conclusion seems valid for shipbuilders. 
This illustrates a point of careful consideration for our study as it shows many shipbuilding 
companies face though supply constraints in the debt capital market. Despite wishing to alter 
their capital structure they might not be able to access the public debt market for financing. 
However, the Economist (2014) reports that over approximately 75% of external financing in 
the overall shipping industry has been provided through bank loans. This indicates that the 
companies are in fact unconstrained when it comes to acquiring bank loans. As rating 
probability assesses the firms’ ability to issue public debt and not their ability to achieve bank 
loans, the findings are not in conflict with our observed leverage ratios. 
 
The oldest shipbuilding company in our sample is a centennial with 101 years since its 
incorporation. The average value is somewhat skewed upwards due to the presence of firm year 
observations, but it seems fair to assume that our shipbuilders represent a relatively stable group 
of companies based on their long lives. The relatively old average age is opposite of what one 
could expect based on the observation of a poor industry profitability and high asset risk. 
However, the unexpected relationship is in line with the shipping finance paradox that states 
that the shipping sector experiences an over supply of finance relative to the performance of the 
industry (Stopford, 2009). 
 
Considering corporate tax rates, levels have varied greatly among the nations represented in our 
sample. While the minimum observation of zero taxes from Bermuda appears to be a tax haven, 
Japan displayed the maximum tax rate observation of 0.516 during the late 1990s. Since 
shipbuilding is a nearly perfectly competitive environment, large differences in tax schemes 
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Table 6-4: Descriptive statistics macroeconomic factors 
Years Mean SD Median Min Max
Ind. Prod. Growth  Pacific Region 17 0.176 0.393 0.000 0.000 1.000
Recession Shipping 17 0.588 0.507 1.000 0.000 1.000
Term Spread 17 0.014 0.011 0.015 -0.001 0.029
GDP Growth 17 0.018 0.018 0.023 -0.041 0.039
Oil Price Change 17 0.191 0.516 0.108 -0.551 1.617
MSCI Stock Market Return 17 0.060 0.211 0.100 -0.426 0.418
World Orderbook Value Change 17 0.164 0.268 0.116 -0.164 0.639
Return Clarksons Newbuild Index 17 0.006 0.112 -0.015 -0.225 0.261
Annual Change Deliveries DWT 17 0.072 0.135 0.085 -0.301 0.295
Return Major Currencies 17 0.002 0.073 0.003 -0.145 0.105
The table displays the macroeconomic factors, the mean, the standard deviation, the median, as well as the 
minimum and the maximum of each factor. All observations are raw, unwinsorized data.
represent a major comparative advantage/disadvantage. Despite variations in our observations 
the median corporate tax rate is almost identical to the average observation. This indicates that 
overall the included shipbuilding nations have operated with relatively similar tax systems. 
6.3.2 Macroeconomic Descriptive Statistics 
Reporting the macroeconomic factors in terms of firm year observations does not make 
immediate sense. Hence, we display the observations across years instead in order to prevent 
skewed values towards the years that contain a higher number of year observations. A detailed 
description of each macroeconomic variable will not be undertaken. This is because we wish to 
highlight the major macroeconomic trends across our sample period and later employ these 
trends to illustrate how they have influenced the leverage ratios of our selected companies.  
The industrial growth in the Pacific region was negative in the years 1998, 2001, and 2009 
(Clarksons, 2014h). 1998-2002 and 2009-2013 are periods characterised as depressions for the 
overall shipping industry (Drobetz et al., 2013). The shipbuilding industry can be said to have 
experienced elongated periods of depression compared to the Pacific region’s industrial 
production.  
Across the sample period the observed term spread is rather stable. However, an observable 
trend is that the spread increases during times of recession mainly as a consequence of lower 
short-term interest rates. Empirical studies performed by Dahlquist and Harvey (2001) show 
that a small term spread can be a predictor of future recessions, which support the indications 
from our findings.  
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Compared to the world’s real average GDP growth between 1900-1999 (Boltho & Toniolo, 
1999), the real growth rate for the G7 countries is in line with the historical long-term growth 
trend. However, the real growth rate has been volatile and the minimum observation from 2009 
is consistent with the end of the financial crisis. The maximum observation is from the year 
2000 and corresponds with the world financial markets’ peak right before the crash in 2001.  
Oil price volatility can be characterized as extreme for our sample period. In absolute terms the 
price has grown from $17.1 in 1997 to an exceptional record of $110.34 in 2013. In connection 
with the great financial crisis the oil price did, however, drop by approximately 60% from 2007 
to 2008. The variation in the oil price seems to correlate with world recessions, the MSCI index, 
and the GDP growth rate. 
During 1997-2013 the average growth rate for the world’s stock markets, represented by the 
MSCI world index, has outperformed the real GDP growth for the G7 countries. However, our 
chosen period includes the build up and collapses of two strong financial bubbles in 2001 and 
2008. This might explain the short-term deviation between the two variables. The stock values 
of our shipbuilding companies follow the movements of the MSCI index.  
Observations from three out of the four shipbuilding variables highlight relatively rough times 
for the shipbuilding companies within our sample period. Judging by the Newbuilding Price 
Index the obtained average price increase is barely positive, while the median is negative. In 
other words, as general prices have increased the prices of ships have been at a standstill despite 
volatility. The sector has seen an average annual increase in the value of the world orderbook 
even though the market has been influence by the global financial downturn. Strong continued 
building activity could partially be attributed to a high amount of new orders from Chinese 
investors and strategic state supported investments in increased capacity at Chinese shipyards 
(OECD, 2008; European Commission, 2013). The fluctuations of the orderbook value have 
followed a similar pattern as the developments of the global economy. Deliveries have across 
the period shown a slight positive trend. However, the industry has experienced an orderbook 
build-up, as deliveries have not kept up with new orders.  
Over the sample period the US dollar has on average been fairly stable against other currencies. 
Despite this the US dollar is volatile, with the largest depreciation being -14.5% and 
appreciation 10.5%. As currency movements are vital to shipbuilders’ operations, these 
movements should have an impact their financial performance and capital structure decisions. 
 48 
7.  Findings and Analysis  
7.1 Detection and Handling of Outliers  
Spurious outliers that create biased effects can influence the distribution of statistical data and 
undermine the performance and relevance of a model (Wooldridge, 2009). In our data sample it 
is especially the market based variables that experience outliers. Examples of this are asset risk 
that ranges from -10.275 to 15.819 and market leverage values observed between -14.408 and 
39.653.  
 
According to Stock and Watson (2012), outliers can be dealt with by either manually correcting 
the observation or excluding it entirely. In previous studies of capital structure determinants, the 
preferred methods are winsorization, removal of outliers through rule of thumb truncation or 
facilitating robust regressions (Getzmann & Lang, 2010). We apply the process of winsorization 
in order to reduce the effect of potentially extreme and unrealistic values. The method provides 
a systematic approach that prohibits data loss and enables us to compare our findings with 
different previous studies. More explicitly, winsorization entails replacing the outliers with the 
limit value of an upper and lower percentile (Dixon & Yuen, 1974). The technique is commonly 
used in empirical research and Frank and Goyal (2009) alongside Getzmann and Lang (2010) 
winsorize their datasets at 0.5%, whereas Drobetz et al. (2013) use 1%. Their reasoning behind 
the applied winsorization factor was that it had to be large enough to remove spurious outliers. 
After testing levels between 0% and 5%, we decided to use a 5% winsorization factor despite it 
being relatively high compared to previous studies. Given the large variation and observed 
extreme values a 5% factor was required for our dataset in order to remove spurious outliers.  
7.2 Correlation Matrix Firm Specific Variables  
Excluding the correlation between market and book leverage, the correlation values between the 
remaining variables are low and we do not regard any of the results as concerning for the 
performance of our models. We do, however, recognize that there are certain variables that 
correlate somewhat with each other and the most significant relationships are briefly outlined.  
To some extent dividend payer and size correlates with a coefficient of 0.373. However, the 
overall size of the correlation is not substantial enough to be of any concern. Rating probability 
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slightly correlates with the market-based variables and the largest observed correlation 
coefficient is with company size at 0.493. This relationship is expected since larger companies 
should be more likely to obtain a credit rating. Again the coefficient seems to be of insufficient 
size to seriously threaten the validity of our estimates.  
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Coefficients
(b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_b))
Fixed Random Difference S.E.
Size 0.046 0.020 0.025 0.010
Tangibility 0.345 0.241 0.104 0.047
Market to book 0.074 0.055 0.019 0.008
Profitability -0.249 -0.295 0.046 0.028
Corporate Tax Rate 0.458 0.243 0.215 0.269
Dividend Payer -0.070 -0.085 0.016 0.005
Rating Probability 0.011 -0.001 0.012 0.015
Asset Risk -0.050 -0.057 0.007 0.002
Operating Leverage -0.027 -0.079 0.052 0.019
b = consistent under Ho and Ha
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho
Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
chi2(9) = 200.270
Prob>chi2 = 0.000
The table displays the results of the Hausman test for fixed vs. random effects regression. 
Table 7-2: Hausman Test for Fixed vs. Random Effects Model 
7.3 Fixed versus Random Effects Model 
The null hypothesis of the Hausman test is strongly rejected with a p-value of 0.000. This means 
that the unobserved effect 𝑢𝑖𝑡 correlates with one or more of the independent variables. As a 
consequence, a random effects model will not be consistent and our results indicate that a fixed 
effects model is the preferred analytic tool to analyse the shipbuilder data sample.  
7.4 Regression Conditions 
The results from the regressions included in our model seem valid to draw statistical inference. 
Assessing the conditions for regressions in particular we observe seemingly normally distributed 
residuals. The histograms resemble the bell curve. Residuals lie tight on the normal probability 
plots with minor deviations for model 2, 4, and 6. Although the mentioned deviations are 
present, the amount of observations used is large enough to utilize the central limit theorem 
(Stock & Watson, 2012). We use clustered robust standard errors to overcome possible 
challenges associated with autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, which are often present in 
panel data (Stock & Watson, 2012). Additionally, we do not observe problems of 
multicollinearity.  
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Table 7-3: Standard leverage regressions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Size 0.00862 0.00822 0.0513*** 0.0456*** -0.00110 0.00118 0.0455* 0.0459*
(0.009) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.025) (0.027)
Tangibility 0.268 0.220 0.484* 0.345 0.278 0.274* 0.266 0.175
(0.162) (0.151) (0.245) (0.264) (0.165) (0.150) (0.208) (0.215)
Market to book 0.0485 0.0311 0.0741*** 0.0742** 0.0945** 0.0664 0.109*** 0.113***
(0.030) (0.040) (0.023) (0.027) (0.040) (0.045) (0.030) (0.029)
Profitability -0.937*** -0.377 -0.478 -0.249 -1.035*** -0.554* -0.487** -0.369
(0.277) (0.288) (0.281) (0.307) (0.292) (0.284) (0.222) (0.253)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.243* 0.316*** 0.539 0.458 0.355** 0.410*** 0.299 0.109
(0.133) (0.105) (0.424) (0.319) (0.141) (0.130) (0.626) (0.562)
Dividend Payer -0.108*** -0.0698** -0.0903*** -0.0433
(0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.027)
Rating Probability 0.0461 0.0110 0.0350 -0.0234
(0.071) (0.077) (0.073) (0.087)
Asset Risk -0.0635** -0.0501** -0.0395* -0.0291**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014)
Operating Leverage -0.135* -0.0269 -0.124* 0.0263
(0.069) (0.064) (0.069) (0.071)
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R-squared 0.141 0.293 0.424 0.469 0.278 0.367 0.560 0.574
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table displays the standard leverage regression results with a sample of 23 globally listed shipping companies in 
the time period 1997-2013. All variables are winsorized at the lower and upper 5th percentile. Clustered, robust 
standard error at firm level are given in the parentheses. Firm and time fixed effects indicates what fixed effects are 
included in the specification.
7.5 Discussion of Results 
7.5.1 Standard Leverage Regressions  
In the following discussion of our findings we facilitate the expected relationships that were 
previously outlined in section 4. We will address the models overall explanatory power, the 
coefficients of independent variables and their statistical significance.  
The standard leverage regressions are run stepwise. First, we run the models with the standard 
leverage determinants inspired by Frank and Goyal (2009). Results are presented in column 1. 
As shown by column 2, we run the regressions with additional variables influenced by the study 
from Drobetz et al. (2013). We add firm and year fixed effects separately. Through this process 
we are able to distinguish between the time invariant and time varying effects. The results of 
which are shown in column 3 to 6. Finally, we run the complete model including all 
independent variables and fixed effects. Results from the final regressions can be found in 
column 7-8.  
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Results in column 1 indicate that the estimated coefficients of size, tangibility, profitability, and 
corporate tax rate exhibit the same patterns as observed by prior studies on the capital 
structures of other industries (Frank & Goyal, 2009; Drobetz et al., 2013). The explanatory 
power of regression model 1 is rather weak of only 14.1%. At a 10% significance level 
profitability has a negative impact on a shipbuilder’s leverage ratio. This result is in line with the 
pecking order theory, as increased profitability will give a firm increased free cash flows and 
earnings that will be used as financing instead of additional external financing. It is also 
somewhat in line with the dynamic trade-off theory when using Frank and Goyal (2009)’s 
argument of passive profit accumulation. Corporate tax rate is the second significant variable, 
however, only at a 10% significance level. The results suggest a positive relationship between 
increased corporate tax rate and leverage, which is in line with our prediction for shipbuilders 
following the trade-off theory. As debt carries a tax shield, increased corporate tax will increase 
the attractiveness of debt at a diminishing rate.  
Including dividend payer, rating probability, asset risk, and operating leverage to the regression 
instantly increases its explanatory power to 29.3%. Corporate tax rate significantly indicates a 
positive relationship with leverage, now reliable at a 1% level. The dividend payer variable, also 
significant at a 1% level, shows a negative relationship with leverage. This result is in line with 
our former prediction and also the related study by Frank and Goyal (2009). From a trade-off 
theory perspective dividend payments should lead to lower leverage as managers have less free 
cash flows at hand and less need for increased debt to handle agency issues. In line with our 
prediction asset risk exhibits a negative relationship with leverage at a 5% significance level. The 
trade-off theory provides an explanation for this, as increased asset risk is associated with higher 
probability of default and bankruptcy costs. This will decrease the attractiveness of debt and 
lead to higher levels of equity. Operating leverage is the final significant variable, however, only 
at a 10% level. The result indicates a negative relationship with leverage, which is in line with the 
trade-off theory. Since the financing is situated on the operating side the need for book leverage 
decreases and the negative relationship is expected. 
In line with earlier studies such as Lemmon et al. (2008) and Drobetz et al. (2013), we should 
experience a considerably higher explanatory power from the models when we add fixed effects 
to the standard OLS leverage regression. Companies’ capital structures are to a large extent 
caused by unobserved components connected to individual differences on a firm and/or time 
level. Thus, one can expect certain of the standard capital structure factors to lose some of their 
statistical significance as the regression also accounts for the year and firm fixed effects 
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(Drobetz et al., 2013). For our regression model the explanatory power increases substantially to 
42.4% and 46.9% when we introduce firm fixed effects in model 3 and 4. It is worth noticing 
that the additional explained variance from adding the extra factors to make model 4 is smaller 
than what is achieved moving from model 1 to model 2. This gives further support to the 
inference that a large part of shipbuilder’s capital structure decisions is based on the unobserved 
company specific rather than the observable effects.  
Looking to column 3 both size and market to book exhibit positive relationships with leverage 
at a 1% significance level. Accordingly, the company size is in line with the trade-off theory, 
whereas the coefficient of the market to book ratio is in line with counter-cyclical leverage ratio 
implied by the pecking order theory. In reality there is often a relationship between stability of 
profits and company size (Hall & Weiss, 1967). Hence, the observed positive influence on 
leverage from size might be attributed to an increase in the firms’ debt capacity. Considering the 
market to book ratio, the positive relationship with book leverage is the opposite of our initial 
prediction. However, it is in line with Drobetz et al. (2013)’s findings from the merchant 
shipping industry. Given the shipbuilders’ poor market valuations a possible interpretation of 
the coefficient, supporting the trade-off theory, is that the higher market to book ratios belong 
to the shipbuilders with the highest debt capacities. Consistent with the trade-off theory and 
partially with the pecking order theory, tangibility exhibits a positive relationship with leverage 
despite being significant at only a 10% level.  
When adding the additional explanatory variables to model 4, both size and market-to-book stay 
significant, the latter now at a 5% level. In addition to the two variables both dividend payer and 
asset risk become significant at a 5% level. This observation supports the previously analyzed 
findings from column 2.  
Column 5 and 6 show the results from the regressions run with year-fixed effects. Compared to 
the regressions run in column 1 and 2, adding the year fixed effects increases the explanatory 
power to 27.8% and 36.7%. The additional explained variance is lower than what is achieved 
through adding firm fixed effects, implying that time invariant factors play the larger role in 
explaining a shipbuilder’s capital structure. Nevertheless, the year-fixed effects regression 
generates regression coefficients indicating the same patterns, with regards to capital structure 
theories, as shown in columns 1 through 4. In column 5 the market to book ratio displays a 
positive relationship with leverage on a 5% significance level. The result for profitability is again 
negative, but is now at a 1% level. Corporate tax rate also shows a positive influence on 
leverage. In column 6 the market to book ratio loses its statistical significance and dividend 
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payer exhibits a negative significant relationship on a 1% level with the leverage ratio. Asset risk 
and operating leverage maintain their weakly significant negative correlation with leverage, 
which provides further support to our initial predictions.  
Our final step is to include both year- and firm fixed effects to the regression model, which 
further improves the models’ explanatory powers. Including all explanatory variables and fixed 
effects yields the highest explanatory power of our models of 57.4%. However, the incremental 
explanatory power of including the additional independent variables is quite modest of only 
1.4%. As such, it seems that the largest share of shipbuilders’ capital structure decisions is based 
on unobserved company and year specific effects. Additionally, there are no changes in the 
economic rationales behind the effect of the variables seeing as the coefficients display the same 
direction as in previous regressions. Size and market to book show significantly positive 
relationships with book leverage, while asset risk has a significantly negative correlation in our 
final regression model.  
Based on the results of the different models a major part of the variance in shipbuilders’ capital 
structures is explained by time invariant factors. Another interesting finding is that the market 
value based factors seem to influence shipbuilders’ capital structure decisions the most. The 
relatively expensive companies, as measured by the market to book ratio, are likely to have more 
debt. A possible explanation is that the shipbuilders with higher market to book ratios are the 
most financially sound companies. When those companies no longer have enough internal 
funds to finance their investments, they reach out to the debt capital markets. Overall there 
seems to be more support for the trade-off than the pecking order theory for our globally listed 
shipbuilders. Given the fact that most shipyards have owners with large ownership shares, it is 
natural for them to emphasize the trade-off costs associated with debt. Revealing information 
through capital issues can, therefore, be assumed to be less concerning to the shipbuilder when 
their ownership is dominated by a few influential owners. This is because large investors might 
possess more information about the company than the average investor. Excluding the market 
to book ratio, our findings are in line with all five studies outlined in section 2.3.1. Additionally, 
the direction of our coefficients matches those found for shipping companies. This indicates 
that shipbuilders follow similar patterns in their capital structure decisions as merchant shipping 
companies.   
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Book Leverage
Size 0.0456*** 0.0453*** 0.0378** 0.0597*** 0.0342*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018)
Tangibility 0.345 0.340 0.248 0.323 0.248
(0.264) (0.261) (0.228) (0.271) (0.229)
Market to book 0.0742** 0.0760** 0.0861*** 0.0757** 0.100***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) (0.030)
Profitability -0.249 -0.264 -0.416 -0.115 -0.380
(0.307) (0.309) (0.244) (0.303) (0.256)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.458 0.422 0.730** 0.657* 0.875**
(0.319) (0.324) (0.341) (0.359) (0.373)
Operating Leverage -0.0269 -0.0259 0.00764 -0.0245 0.00531
(0.064) (0.064) (0.063) (0.079) (0.063)
Dividend Payer -0.0698** -0.0686** -0.0452* -0.0721** -0.0421*
(0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.031) (0.023)
Asset Risk -0.0501** -0.0494** -0.0287 -0.0567** -0.0277
(0.022) (0.022) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017)
Rating Probability 0.0110 0.00899 -0.00996 -0.00800 -0.0209
(0.077) (0.078) (0.080) (0.073) (0.081)
Industrial Production Pacific Region 0.0221
(0.014)
Recession (Shipping) 0.0915***
(0.020)
Lagged Term Spread 1.457*
(0.827)
GDP Growth 1.129
(0.740)
Oil Price Change -0.0223*
(0.013)
Stock Market Return Annual MSCI -0.137**
(0.061)
World Orderbook Value Change -0.147***
(0.049)
Return Newbuild Price Index -0.221***
(0.075)
Annual Change Deliveries DWT -0.0762
(0.059)
Return Major Currencies 0.304***
(0.078)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 285 285 285 269 285
Adjusted R-squared 0.469 0.470 0.544 0.521 0.562
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table displays the standard leverage regression results with a sample of 23 globally listed shipping companies 
in the time period 1997-2013. The model is complemented with possible macroeconomic determinants of 
leverage. All variables are winsorized at the lower and upper 5th percentile, except the macroeconomic variables. 
Clustered, robust standard error at firm level are given in the parentheses. Firm fixed effects indicates what fixed 
effects are included in the specification.
Table 7-4: Macroeconomic determinants of leverage 
7.5.2 Impact of Macroeconomic Factors  
In this section we discuss the impact of macroeconomic factors through running separate 
regressions. The underlying reason is that we wish to isolate the effects that originate from the 
cyclicality of leverage. We assess the cyclicality by four different measures. In column 1 we 
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repeat the results from the firm-fixed effects model from column 4 in table 7-4. We include firm 
fixed effects to control for unobserved factors varying across shipbuilders. However, following 
convention when assessing macroeconomic factors in previous capital structure research (see 
for example Korajczyk and Levy (2003) and Drobetz et al. (2013)) we do not include year fixed 
effects. The findings in column 2 and 3 display the results of adding indicator variables of 
economic cycles to our benchmark regression model, respectively recessions indicated by the 
industrial production of the Pacific region followed by shipping recession. Running the 
regressions with additional macroeconomic indicators gives the results displayed in column 4. 
Column 5 shows the results from including the shipyard specific macroeconomic factors.  
As it was assumed that the growth in industrial production would influence shipbuilders, we are 
a bit surprised by its insignificant relationship with leverage ratios16. Even though the shipyards 
should be affected by decreases in industrial production, their financial leverage seems 
unaffected. According to Drobetz et al. (2013) the capital structures of shipping companies 
seem unaffected by general macroeconomic recessions. From this one can infer that merchant 
shippers might not substantially change their amount of ships on order given a short-term 
recession. As shipbuilders are suppliers to the shipping industry, this might partially explain the 
insignificant relationship between leverage and the Pacific region’s industrial production growth.   
In line with our prediction there is a clear counter-cyclical relationship in shipbuilders’ leverage 
ratios when examining the industry specific market conditions through the shipping recession 
dummy. The negative relationship supports the predictions of the pecking order theory. At a 
1% significance level the relationship appears to be quite strong. Poor macroeconomic 
conditions may increase risk aversion amongst investors and restrict the supply of equity capital. 
Hence, increased leverage ratios can be a result of companies taking on additional debt in lack 
of other opportunities to raise capital. Another argument is that issuing more debt during 
recessions enables the shipbuilder to reveal less adverse selection information to its investors. 
Equity issuances are on a general basis expensive and if investors believe that a shipbuilder is 
experiencing financial distress one can expect the cost to increase further. Based on our 
observations, it seems like shipbuilders’ financial managers carry the same concerns. Including 
the shipping cycles strengthens the explanatory power of our model to 54.4%.  
                                                 
16 In results not tabulated, we used the state of the US economy, the growth in industrial production dummy for the Atlantic 
region, as well as the OECD. These regressions yielded approximately the same results as using the growth in industrial 
production dummy for the Pacific region. 
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Although international trade and the state of the world economy are very important to the 
shipping industry, their indicators seem to affect the capital structure decisions of shipbuilders 
to a smaller extent than first anticipated. The model’s explanatory power is lower when adding 
the second set of factors compared to column 3. We find only weak significance at a 10% level 
of the lagged term spread and the Brent Crude oil price change. The lagged term spread 
supports a pro-cyclical leverage ratio and the trade-off theory with a seemingly large coefficient. 
This is against our initial prediction. The return of the Brent Crude oil price seems to exert a 
negative impact on leverage ratios. In light of this and our general prediction of counter-cyclical 
leverage ratios, it can be inferred that shipbuilders are somewhat positively exposed to the oil 
price development. 
The return on the MSCI also supports the pecking order theory. When examining firm level 
factors we did not find any evidence of market timing behavior among shipbuilders. However, 
the MSCI return’s effect on book leverage suggests that the shipbuilders do exhibit some 
behavior in line with the market timing theory. An explanation may be that shipbuilders’ 
financial managers pay more attention to the general capital market conditions than their own 
stock prices. Drobetz et al. (2013) were not able to find a relationship between market stock 
returns and leverage. This indicates that shipbuilders differentiate their capital structure 
decisions somewhat from merchant shipping companies by including evaluations of stock 
market movements.  
Including shipbuilder specific macroeconomic indicators yields the model with the highest 
explanatory power of 56.2%, as shown in column 5. Again the signs of the coefficients give 
support to our prediction of counter-cyclical leverage ratios. The effect of changes in the world 
orderbook, return on newbuilding prices and return of the Real Trade Weighted US Dollar 
Index: Major Currencies are strongly significant on a 1% level. Shipbuilders seem to be more 
sensitive to changes in newbuild prices than to the overall changes in the world orderbook. 
Leverage shows a negative relationship with changes in the world orderbook. Based on the 
notion of a counter-cyclical leverage ratio and following the discussion in section 4.2.2, it can be 
inferred that shipbuilders associate an increase in the world orderbook value with a favorable 
market development. The large positive coefficient from US Dollar Index is consistent with 
both our prediction and prior empirical evidence stating that the variable is the most important 
factor for shipbuilders leverage ratios. The effect from changes in world deliveries yields 
insignificant results, and accordingly we deem world deliveries to have a much smaller impact 
on leverage ratios than first expected.  
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Combined our analysis suggests that including macroeconomic variables significantly increases 
the explanatory strength of our regression models. Overall, our results support the notion of a 
counter-cyclical leverage ratio within the shipbuilding industry. However, our results are not 
conclusive given the ambiguous results shown from the lagged term spread’s effect. Another 
interesting result is that macroeconomic conditions seem to influence capital structure decisions 
of shipbuilders to a much larger extent than for the closely related shipping industry. A pattern 
of differences between the firm and macroeconomic indicators’ effect on capital structure 
decisions emerge when assessing both simultaneously. On a firm specific level shipbuilders 
generally seem to follow a capital structure largely based on thoughts from the trade-off theory. 
When it comes to the effects from the macroeconomic environment, relationships predicted by 
the pecking-order theory seem to dominate the movements of our shipbuilders’ leverage ratios.  
7.5.3 Speed of Adjustment Estimators  
We now turn to the dynamics of capital structure decisions. Corresponding with the theory 
outlined in section 5.3 we estimate the speed of adjustment for a shipbuilder to achieve its target 
capital structure. The model parameters from section 7.5.1 can be seen as factors that indicate 
the target capital structure for a shipbuilding company at a given point in time. To determine if 
the decision dynamics alter depending on economic cycles, we include a cross product term for 
speed of adjustment during recessions17.  
Table 7-5 displays the results from the speed of adjustment estimation. The AB and BB 
estimators have been calculated using the xtabond2 program in Stata made by Roodman (2009). 
With 285 individual firm years the shipbuilding dataset is rather small. Therefore, we created 
one instrument per lag distance and variable. The more conventional procedure would be to 
create one instrument per year, lag distance, and variable. Although it reduces the efficiency in 
large samples, it can avoid the bias created when the number of instruments goes towards the 
number of observations (Roodman, no date). The predetermined variable is the lagged leverage. 
Firm specific variables have been treated as exogenous. The AB and BB estimators do not show 
signs of autocorrelation on levels through the AR(2) test (Roodman, 2009). There is no second 
                                                 
17 When using the shipping recession dummy, we observe the same relationship for the speed of adjustment during recessions as 
when using the growth in Pacific region’s industrial production dummy. However, with 10 out of 17 years of our sample being 
characterised as recession years for the shipping industry, we do not find these results appropriate to present, as it would rather 
indicate a difference between two distinctive periods and not the dynamics of macroeconomic cyclicality.  
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Table 7-5: Speed of Adjustment 
OLS FE AB BB
Dependent variable: Book Leverage
Book Leverage (t-1) 0.708*** 0.458*** 0.108* 0.155**
(0.053) (0.126) (0.063) (0.063)
Book Leverage (t-1)*Ind. Prod. Pacific Region 0.0965** 0.242** 0.170*** 0.143***
(0.041) (0.104) (0.047) (0.046)
Speed of Adjustment 29 % 54 % 89 % 85 %
Speed of Adjustment in Recession 20 % 30 % 72 % 70 %
Size 0.00704 0.0317* 0.0244* 0.00985**
(0.006) (0.017) (0.015) (0.005)
Tangibility 0.00783 0.0405 0.448*** 0.177***
(0.076) (0.131) (0.119) (0.054)
Market to book -0.0154 0.0332 -0.00626 -0.00111
(0.020) (0.032) (0.019) (0.015)
Profitability -0.166 -0.246 -0.0385 -0.318***
(0.179) (0.192) (0.168) (0.117)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.0265 0.229 -0.371 0.191***
(0.068) (0.323) (0.321) (0.048)
Dividend Payer -0.0191 -0.0164 -0.0244 -0.0521***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Rating Probability -0.0103 -0.0102 0.0320 -0.00738
(0.033) (0.051) (0.039) (0.029)
Asset Risk -0.0361*** -0.0209* -0.0242* -0.0493***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Operating Leverage -0.0706** 0.0257 -0.0477 -0.111***
(0.029) (0.049) (0.041) (0.023)
Observations 262 262 239 262
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table displays the different adjustment speeds for OLS, FE, AB, and BB estimators for the sample of 23 
shipbuilders in the period 1997-2013. Standard errors are given in parantheses. Firm and Year fixed effects 
included for the FE estimator. The percentage speed of adjustment, i.e. how much of the gap from target leverage 
is closed within one year, is given in rows 3 and 4. For the AB and BB estimators, the lagged leverage is treated as 
the predetermined variable and the firm specific variables are exogenous.
order correlation in differences. The restrictions are over-identified and performing the Sargans 
test of truly exogenous instruments is possible (Stock & Watson, 2012). With the null 
hypothesis of exogenous instruments strongly rejected, the validity of the results can be 
seriously questioned. Additionally, our sample of 23 firms over 17 years raises the question of 
fit. It is arguable that the sample matrix might not be of sufficient size to fulfill the criteria of 
small T and large N. Consequently, we tabulate the GMM-estimators, but we refrain from 
discussing them and leave interpretations up to the reader. Although the OLS estimator is 
biased upwards and the FE estimator does not provide complete control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, they seem to be the most valid estimates of adjustment speeds. Because of this 
our discussion is based solely on inferences from the OLS and FE models.  
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Table 7-6: Comparison between speed of adjustment between the merchant shipping and shipyard 
industry 
OLS FE AB BB
Iversen & Noraas (2014)
Speed of Adjustment 29 % 54 % 89 % 85 %
Half -lif e 2.01 0.89 0.31 0.37
Speed of Adjustment in recessions 20 % 30 % 72 % 70 %
Half -lif e 3.11 1.94 0.54 0.58
Drobetz et al. (2013)
Speed of Adjustment 22 % 42 % 59 % 47 %
Half -lif e 2.79 1.27 0.78 1.10
Speed of Adjustment in recessions 18 % 40 % 57 % 45 %
Half -lif e 3.54 1.34 0.81 1.15
The table displays the speed of adjustment of our studies and the results from Drobetz et al. (2013). Our studies is 
calculated using a sample of 23 firms in the time period 1997-2013. Drobetz et al.'s (2013) sample is of 115 shipping 
companies between 1992 and 2010.  Half life is given by log⁡(0.5)/Log(1-λ) 
Both the OLS and FE speed of adjustment estimates are significant at a 5% level. The findings 
from our sample are relatively in line with expectations from other previous empirical studies, 
but hold some distinctive differences. Shipbuilders seem to adjust their capital structure 
significantly faster than the firms studied by Kayhan and Titman (2007). Additionally, 
shipbuilders seem to adjust their capital structure twice as fast as the non-financial firms 
investigated by Lemmon et al. (2008). Accordingly, one can claim that shipbuilders compared to 
other industries face lower adjustment costs relative to deviation costs. The question remains 
whether it is the adjustment costs that are lower, the deviation costs that are higher, or a 
combination of both. 
In line with Hackbarth et al. (2006), Cook and Tang (2010) and Halling et al. (2012), we find 
substantially slower adjustment speeds during recessions. Under normal economic conditions 
shipbuilders seem to adjust faster towards their target capital structure than companies in the 
closely related shipping industry (Drobetz et al., 2013). As pointed out by Drobetz et al (2013) 
shipping companies are highly influenced by business cycles and should exhibit a large 
difference between adjustment speeds under prosperous and poor economic conditions. This 
development is also true for our estimates as shipbuilders adjust 31%-44% slower during 
recessions as measured by the OLS and FE estimators. When a shipyard goes into a recession, 
our results imply that they need approximately 1.05-1.10 years longer to half the deviation from 
their current target capital structure than during normal economic conditions. During recessions 
the cost of debt capital and probability of default will increase, which will substantially influence 
adjustment speeds (Drobetz et al., 2013).  
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In times of recessions shipbuilders adjust their capital structures slower than merchant shipping 
companies. Being highly leveraged, merchant shipping companies have high costs of financial 
distress and need to quickly adjust their capital structure to meet the bank’s requirements 
(Drobetz et al., 2013). In other words they face relatively high deviation costs. Shipbuilders can 
be assumed to experience lower costs of financial distress due to an overall lower leverage ratio. 
Additionally, many shipbuilders are major corporations in terms of size, important to the home 
nation’s economy and often face owners with large ownership shares who are well positioned 
and trusted in the market. For example one investor owns 67.3% of ABG Shipyard, 45.8% of 
CSIC is owned by the Chinese government and Daewoo is 31.5% owned by the Korea 
Development Bank. Consequently, we suggest that the slower observed adjustment by 
shipbuilders indicates lower deviation costs rather than higher adjustment costs.  
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8. Conclusion 
This master thesis aims to provide insights to the underlying determinants driving capital 
structure decisions for globally listed shipbuilding companies. Data was collected from 23 
companies over the period 1997-2013. Combined our dataset of 285 firms year observations 
sourced from ThomsonOne/Worldscope, Clarksons, NBER, and the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis helped us describe and analyze the capital structures of our chosen shipbuilders.  
Our regression results indicate that there are differences between firm specific and 
macroeconomic factors for shipbuilders’ capital structure decisions. On a firm specific level the 
trade-off theory seems most applicable to understand the determinants of capital structure. Size 
and asset risk exhibit the strongest relationships in line with the trade-off theory. However, the 
evidence is not conclusive as the market to book ratio gives support to decisions being based on 
the pecking-order theory. The explanatory power of our model increases by adding more 
independent determinants, but the effect is smaller when adjusting for firm and time fixed 
effects. Overall, unobserved company specific effects seem to play the larger role in explaining 
shipbuilders’ capital structure decisions.  
The capital structure decisions, as a function of the macroeconomic environment, are best 
understood from a pecking-order perspective. Shipbuilders display a large degree of counter-
cyclicality in their leverage ratios. An appreciation of the US dollar leads to shipbuilders taking 
on more debt, which confirms earlier studies’ findings of currency being of major importance to 
shipyards. Findings related to the MSCI World Index support that shipbuilders act consistently 
with the market timing theory.  
Although it is important to remember that our models carry certain biases, shipbuilders seem to 
use approximately 0.89-2.01 years to half the deviation from their target capital structures during 
normal economic conditions. Compared to other industries that were researched using the same 
estimators, this is relatively fast. Our findings imply that the cost of adjustment in relation to the 
deviation cost is relatively lower in the shipbuilding industry. Another key finding for capital 
structure dynamics is the distinct difference between normal economic conditions and 
recessions. During recessions shipbuilders display adjustment speeds of 31%-44% slower than 
during normal economic conditions. The results indicate that shipbuilders experience increased 
adjustment costs during recessions.  
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9. Limitations and Further Research  
With a rather small sample size of 285 individual firm-year observations from 23 different 
companies the results may be skewed towards the capital structure of certain companies. A 
larger sample would increase the statistical reliability. For instance, a larger sample size would be 
preferable for the GMM-estimators, which are intended for “small T, large N” samples 
(Roodman, 2009). Considering our applied selection requirements we have chosen to include 
only listed companies instead of all shipbuilders. Loosening up the requirements and including a 
wider spectrum of shipbuilding companies could potentially give other insights.  
Winsorizing the variables has been a proactive solution for dealing with the bias created by what 
is assumed to be spurious outliers. However, the heterogeneity itself could provide interesting 
insights to the industry’s capital structure determinants and by adjusting the dataset the potential 
effect might be eliminated. Our choice of 5% winsorization could be a limitation as it goes 
against the 1% convention from related studies.  
First, analyzing alternative determinants than those included in our study is an area of future 
research. Alternative variables can be chosen based on measurement methods, e.g. to check the 
robustness of our results. Completely new determinants would also have the potential to yield 
interesting insights to capital structure decisions. In order to determine new variables we believe 
a case study based approach interviewing CFOs of shipbuilding companies would be interesting. 
A second opportunity for further research is a deeper understanding of the composition of 
shipbuilders’ leverage ratios. Looking into what kind of debt shipbuilders most commonly 
possess such as bank loans, long-term financing or bonds could create a better understanding of 
their leverage ratios. Thirdly, the shipbuilding industry seems to offer different payment 
schedules based on market conditions, which indirectly should affect the leverage ratios of 
shipyards. Thus, a deeper study of the connection between payment schedules and leverage 
ratios also offers an exciting area of future research. 
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Definition Source
Database code/Variable 
explanation 
Firm-level Variables 
Book-leverage Ratio of long- and short-term debt tot total 
book assets 
ThomsonOne (LT + ST Debt) / 
Total Book Assets
Market-leverage Ratio of long- and short- term debt to the 
market value of assets 
ThomsonOne (LT + ST Debt) / 
Enterprise Value
Tangibility Ratio of fixed to total book assets ThomsonOne Net PP&E / Total Book Assets
Growth 
Opportunities 
Market-to-Book ratio equal to ratio of 
market value of assets to book value of 
assets 
ThomsonOne Enterprise Value / 
Total Book Assets
Company Size Natural logarithm of total book assets ThomsonOne ln(Total Book Assets)
Profitability Ratio of earnings before interest, 
depreciation and amortization to total book 
assets 
ThomsonOne EBITDA / Total Book Assets
Dividend payer Indicator dummy variable equal to one if the 
company pays dividends in the given year 
ThomsonOne -
Asset Risk Unlevered volatility of stock returns, Datastream SD(stock in year t) * (Mkt Value of 
Equity)/Enterprise Value)
Operating leverage Ratio of operating expese to total book 
assets
ThomsonOne Operating Expenses / 
Total Book Assets
Rating probability Estimated rating probability for a firm that 
year 
Drobetz et al. 
(2013), 
ThomsonOne
Logit function of tangibility, market 
to book, profitability, R&D/Sales, 
age, and volatility
Price Run-up Stock return over 12 months immediately 
preceding the leverage observation 
Datastream (P(year t) / P (year t-1)) - 1
Incorporation 
Country
Juristiction the company is incorporated in Bloomberg -
Company Age Years since foundation ThomsonOne Year of observation - year of 
incorporation
Corporate Tax Rate Corporate Tax Rate of the incorporation 
country
KPMG, OECD -
Orderbook Annual deadweight tons in order per 
company's affiliated shipyards
Clarksons -
Table 11-1: Variable definitions (1/2) 
11. Appendix  
11.1 Variable Definitions  
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Table 11-2: Variable definitions (2/2) 
Definition Source
Database code/Variable 
explanation 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Growth Industrial 
Production
Indicator dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
industrial production growth is negative, 0 
otherwise. The included countries are China, 
Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Philippines, Thailand, 
Malaysia, Indonesia and India
Clarksons 55763
Recession (shipping) Indicator dummy variable equal to one 
during depressed periods in the shipping 
industry
Drobetz et al. 
(2013)
-
Term Spread One period lagged term spread between the 
10-year interest series and the one-year 
interest series of US treasuries 
St. Louis Fed -
GDP Growth Aggregated growth rate in the G7 countries Datastream G7OCFGDR
Brent crude oil Annual change in the brent crude oil price Clarksons 19710
MSCI World Index Annual return from MSCI world index MSWRLD$
Shipbuilding Market Variables 
Newbuilding Price Index Annual change in the Clarksons 
Newbuilding Price Index 
Clarksons 11649
Deliveries Annual change in the Total Deliveries by 
Region - World DWT
40994
World Orderbook Annual change in the value of Orderbook by 
Area - World 
61607
US dollar Index Annual change in the real-trade weighted US 
dollar index "Majon Currencies" 
St. Louis Fed -
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Company Name Largest Owner Ownership 
Percentage
ABG Shipyard Ltd ABG International Pvt. Ltd. 67.3 %
Aker Shipyard Converto Capital Fund AS 57.6 %
Bergen Group Magnus Stangeland 29.5 %
Bharati Shipyard Limited Bharti Infratech Projects Pvt. Ltd. 32.0 %
China CSSC Holdings Limited China State Shipbuilding Corporation 61.1 %
China Ocean Shipbuilding Industry Group Limited Li Ming 6.3 %
China Shipbuilding Industry company Limited China Shipbulding Industry Corporation 45.8 %
CSBC Corporation, Taiwan Ministry of Economic Affairs 33.6 %
Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine Engineering Co., Ltd. Korea Development Bank 31.5 %
Guangzhou Shipyard International Company Limited China State Shipbuilding Corporation 52.4 %
Hanjin Heavy Industries & Construction Co.,Ltd National Pension Service 8.4 %
Hyundai Heavy Industries Co.,Ltd Jeong Mong Jun 10.2 %
Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Co.,Ltd Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. 45.2 %
JES International Holdings Limited JES Overseas Investment Ltd. 50.8 %
Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding Co.,Ltd. Mitsui & Co Ltd 5.2 %
Naikai Zosen Corporation Hitachi Zosen Corp 29.6 %
Nam Cheong Limited S.K. Tiong Enterprise Sdn Bhd 27.3 %
Namura Shipbuilding Co.,Ltd. Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp 6.4 %
Samsung Heavy Industries Co.,Ltd Samsung Electronics Co Ltd 17.6 %
Sasebo Heavy Industries Co., Ltd. Nippon Steel & Sumitomo Metal Corp 9.7 %
Sembcorp Marine Ltd Temasek Holdings Pte. Ltd. 60.7 %
STX Offshore & Shipbuilding Co.,Ltd. Not Available Not Available
Yangzijiang Shipbuilding (Holdings) Ltd. Newyard Worldwide Holdings Ltd. 26.1 %
The table displays the included companies and their respective ownership structures as of 13.05.2014. STX is not 
available due to restructurings
Table 11-3: Company list, data sourced from ThompsonOne 
11.2 Company List, Yards by Size, and Financing Choices 
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Table 11-4: List of yards by size (Clarksons, 2014a) 
 
Table 11-5: Financing opportunities for shipbuilders (OECD, 2007, p. 6) 
Orderbook Capacity
Rank Shipbuilder Shipyard CGT DWT CGT 000' DWT 000'
1. Hyundai Heavy Industries Ulsan 7559 17844 3840 12651
2. Daewoo Okpo 5702 13472 3094 9723
3. Samsung Heavy Industries Geoje 5398 8768 2972 8712
4. Hyundai Mipo Ulsan 4196 8470 1557 3274
5. Hyundai Samho Samho 3187 10277 1745 5880
6. Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shanghai 2456 15030 796 4510
7. Jiangsu New YZJ Jingjian 2452 8762 700 2574
8. Hudong Zhonghua Shanghai 2137 4036 646 2083
9. Dalian Shipbuilding Dalian 1870 7808 1131 6057
10. STX Shipbuilding Dalian 1758 4904 1238 5082
The table displays the ten largest shipbuilders according to size of orderbook in terms of CGT as of March 2014
Instrument Leading Provider/Advisor Loan to 
value
Active Markets Vessel Type Tax 
Benefits
Debt Markets 
Bilateral Loans HSH Nordbank 65 % Germany Any No 
Syndicated Loans Nordea 65 % Norway Any No 
Finance Companies GE Capital 75 % USA Any No 
Subordinated Debt Navigation Finance 100 % USA Any No 
High Yield Bonds Jefferies & Co <=100% USA/Norway Any No 
Export Credit KEXIM <=80% Korea Newbuilds No 
Equity Markets Min. size
SPAC Maxim Group USD 100m USA Any No 
Private Equity Dahlman Rose USD 100m USA Any Sometimes 
Public Equity Merrill Lynch USD 100m
USA/Singapore/ 
Norway 
Any No 
Vessel Leasing 
German KG Konig & Co. 100 % Germany Newbuilds Yes 
Norwegian KS Ness & Risan 100 % Norway Any No 
Private Leasing Co's First Ship Lease 100 % Global Any No 
Public Leasing Co's Ship Finance International 100 % USA/Singapore Any No 
The table displays different methods of finance within the shipping/shipbuilding industry.
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11.3 Pre-requisites for Regression Models 
In order for a multiple regression OLS to be valid four assumptions must be met. These will 
briefly be outlined in the coming sections.  
Linearity 
The dependent variable y must be a linear function of each of the independent variables in 
order for the regression to be valid. The model will try to estimate a linear relationship between 
the variables, even when the linearity criteria is unfulfilled, which will result in an unreliable 
model. Transforming the variables (e.g. to logarithmic form) can be helpful in order to 
overcome this challenge (Keller, 2008). 
Normality 
The residuals (i.e. the distance one single observation is from the mean) must be normally 
distributed with a mean 𝜇 = 0 and variance of 𝜎2 (𝑒 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎2). A test for normality will reveal 
if there is either skewness and/or kurtosis present. The level of skewness depends on the degree 
to which the distribution is symmetrical around the average. Kurtosis measures the thickness of 
the distribution’s tails. In case the null hypothesis 𝐻0, which states that the observations are 
normally distributed and that the kurtosis and skewness in line with the normal distribution is 
not rejected, then normality can be assumed (Keller, 2008).  
Homoscedasticity 
A third criteria for a multiple regression to be valid is whether or not the residuals have constant 
variance (𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒|𝑥) = 𝜎2), meaning that they should be independent of the value of 𝑥. OLS 
will not be the best estimator and inferences based on the model will be invalid when the 
residuals show signs of heteroscedasticity (e.g. trending/varying variance). Heteroscedastic error 
terms can be overcome by calculating Eicker-Huber-White standard errors (Stock & Watson, 
2012), which are used in this thesis.  
Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more of the independent variables are correlated, which 
reduces the robustness of the model. When presumably independent variables correlate, it 
becomes more difficult to determine the causality relationship (i.e. which independent variable 
actually has what effect on the dependent factor) (Keller, 2008). We have tested this by looking 
at the correlation matrix.  
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Autocorrelation 
According to Stock and Watson (2012), autocorrelation occurs when the residuals correlate over 
time, which often is the case when working with time-series data. Autocorrelation will lead to 
erroneous standard errors, and positive autocorrelation will lead to a higher probability of 
making type I errors. Panel data sets may be tested for autocorrelation with a Wooldridge test 
(Wooldridge, 2009).  
For fixed effect regressions the standard errors may be both heteroscedastic and autocorrelated. 
This challenge can be resolved through the use of clustered and robust standard errors. These 
standard errors allow for correlation within a cluster, as long as the error terms are uncorrelated 
across clusters. However, it must be noted that the clustered standard errors may deviate 
significantly from standard errors that do not allow for heteroscedasticity/autocorrelation.  
(Stock & Watson, 2012). 
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11.4 Illustration of Variables 
  
Figure 11-3: Clarksons Newbuild 
Price (Clarksons, 2014d) & Oil 
price (Clarksons, 2014e) 
Figure 11-2: MSCI and G7 GDP 
Growth, both sourced from 
Datastream 
Figure 11-1: Historical term spread 
(NBER, 2014) 
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Figure 11-4: Global orderbook composition by geography (Clarksons, 2014a) 
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Figure 11-5: World fleet composition and development (Clarksons, 2014b) 
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11.5 Alternative Regressions: Market Leverage 
Table 11-6: Standard leverage regression with market leverage 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: market leverage
Size -0.0543** -0.0465 0.0111 0.0747 -0.0837*** -0.0753** -0.0629 0.00998
(0.023) (0.036) (0.080) (0.080) (0.023) (0.035) (0.105) (0.079)
Tangibility 0.202 0.252 0.308 0.887 0.291 0.448 -0.116 0.623
(0.402) (0.412) (0.662) (0.744) (0.379) (0.328) (0.563) (0.583)
Market to book -0.0325 -0.245** 0.0806 -0.155 0.142 -0.0778 0.275** 0.0328
(0.126) (0.101) (0.124) (0.097) (0.118) (0.077) (0.120) (0.076)
Profitability -1.268* -0.594 -0.548 -0.599 -1.804** -1.612** -1.274 -1.627**
(0.697) (0.789) (0.824) (0.868) (0.693) (0.646) (0.813) (0.642)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.882*** 1.132*** 1.734 1.039 1.287*** 1.521*** 3.841 3.189
(0.308) (0.289) (1.510) (1.298) (0.330) (0.327) (2.628) (2.278)
Dividend Payer -0.337*** -0.360*** -0.241*** -0.241**
(0.076) (0.091) (0.084) (0.086)
Rating Probability 0.502* 0.553 0.470* 0.405
(0.252) (0.327) (0.235) (0.297)
Asset Risk 0.177* 0.231* 0.275*** 0.314***
(0.092) (0.114) (0.093) (0.102)
Operating Leverage -0.159 -0.159 -0.0779 -0.0201
(0.128) (0.232) (0.126) (0.216)
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
Adjusted R-squared 0.065 0.238 0.159 0.314 0.196 0.379 0.309 0.448
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table displays the standard leverage regression results with a sample of 23 globally listed shipping companies in 
the time period 1997-2013. All variables are winsorized at the lower and upper 5th percentile. Clustered, robust 
standard error at firm level are given in the parentheses. Firm and time fixed effects indicates what fixed effects are 
included in the specification.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: Market Leverage
Size 0.0747 0.0728 0.0438 0.126 0.0276
(0.080) (0.079) (0.079) (0.077) (0.076)
Tangibility 0.887 0.855 0.501 1.086 0.533
(0.744) (0.734) (0.609) (0.740) (0.566)
Market to book -0.155 -0.142 -0.108 -0.133 -0.0198
(0.097) (0.094) (0.087) (0.112) (0.074)
Profitability -0.599 -0.715 -1.268* -0.628 -1.394*
(0.868) (0.858) (0.729) (0.772) (0.690)
Corporate Tax Rate 1.039 0.769 2.123 2.262 2.704**
(1.298) (1.287) (1.281) (1.396) (1.259)
Operating Leverage -0.159 -0.152 -0.0216 -0.381 -0.0115
(0.232) (0.230) (0.204) (0.230) (0.206)
Dividend Payer -0.360*** -0.351*** -0.262*** -0.310** -0.255***
(0.091) (0.088) (0.088) (0.114) (0.083)
Asset Risk 0.231* 0.236** 0.316*** 0.206 0.314***
(0.114) (0.112) (0.107) (0.120) (0.104)
Rating Probability 0.553 0.538 0.469 0.249 0.422
(0.327) (0.322) (0.336) (0.325) (0.330)
Industrial Production Pacific Region 0.166***
(0.056)
Recession (Shipping) 0.366***
(0.069)
Lagged Term Spread 6.338**
(2.834)
GDP Growth -2.628
(3.344)
Oil Price Change -0.0659
(0.057)
Stock Market Return Annual MSCI -0.0589
(0.211)
World Orderbook Value Change -0.547***
(0.101)
Return Newbuild Price Index -1.123***
(0.235)
Annual Change Deliveries DWT 0.0675
(0.256)
Return Major Currencies 1.148***
(0.343)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 285 285 285 269 285
Adjusted R-squared 0.314 0.327 0.420 0.296 0.443
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table displays the standard leverage regression results with a sample of 23 globally listed shipping companies 
in the time period 1997-2013. The model is complemented with possible macroeconomic determinants of 
leverage. All variables are winsorized at the lower and upper 5th percentile, except the macroeconomic variables. 
Clustered, robust standard error at firm level are given in the parentheses. Firm fixed effects indicates what fixed 
effects are included in the specification.
Table 11-7: Macroeconomics determinants of leverage with market leverage 
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Table 11-8: Speed of adjustment with market leverage 
 
 
OLS FE AB BB
Dependent variable: Market Leverage
Market Leverage (t-1) 0.470*** 0.276*** -0.114* -0.108*
(0.060) (0.075) (0.060) (0.059)
Market Leverage (t-1)*Ind. Prod. Pacific Region 0.149 0.178 0.272*** 0.283***
(0.106) (0.195) (0.062) (0.057)
Speed of Adjustment 53 % 72 % 111 % 110 %
Speed of Adjustment in Recession 38 % 55 % 84 % 82 %
Size 0.0278 0.0428 0.0736 -0.0160
(0.031) (0.067) (0.059) (0.019)
Tangibility 0.273 0.756** 1.734*** 0.543***
(0.278) (0.359) (0.478) (0.198)
Market to book -0.322*** -0.106 -0.250*** -0.396***
(0.089) (0.088) (0.078) (0.058)
Profitability -0.427 -1.468*** 0.835 -0.433
(0.510) (0.468) (0.704) (0.465)
Corporate Tax Rate 0.280 2.278 -0.301 0.856***
(0.196) (1.838) (1.336) (0.187)
Dividend Payer -0.122* -0.117 -0.264*** -0.234***
(0.068) (0.088) (0.075) (0.054)
Rating Probability -0.116 -0.0259 0.441*** 0.160
(0.244) (0.299) (0.170) (0.125)
Asset Risk 0.0929 0.238** 0.264*** 0.172***
(0.082) (0.100) (0.054) (0.042)
Operating Leverage -0.241** -0.209 -0.531*** -0.315***
(0.091) (0.181) (0.169) (0.092)
Observations 262 262 239 262
* Statistical significance at 10% level
** Statistical significance at 5% level
*** Statistical significance at 1% level
The table displays the different adjustment speeds for OLS, FE, AB, and BB estimators for the sample of 23 
shipbuilders in the period 1997-2013. Standard errors are given in parantheses. Firm and Year fixed effects 
included for the FE estimator. The percentage speed of adjustment, i.e. how much of the gap from target leverage 
is closed within one year, is given in rows 3 and 4. For the AB and BB estimators, the lagged leverage is treated as 
the predetermined variable and the firm specific variables are exogenous.
